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I. Immunity of the United Nations
Following the uprising in Libya and Muammar Gaddafi's
subsequent repression of the civilian population, the U.N. Security
Council approved the use of "all necessary measures" to protect
civilians in Resolution 1973.' Subsequently, the (then) Libyan
Government asked the U.N. Secretary-General to investigate
alleged civilian deaths arising from NATO bombings
implementing the resolution.2 If such actions were found to
violate the laws of war or exceed the Security Council's
authorization for the use of forces in Resolution 1973, who would
be responsible? The United Nations has also been accused of
causing a cholera outbreak in Haiti, after deploying Nepalese
f LLM Columbia University School of Law; LLB (Hons) University of Sydney. I wish
to thank Larry D. Johnson for insightful comments.
I S.C. Res. 1973, $ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
2 See Souhail Karam, Libya Asks U.N. to Probe NATO "Abuses," REUTERS, Aug.
20, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/20/us-libya-un-idUSTRE
77JlSC20110820.
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peacekeepers without testing all individuals in the unit for
cholera.' In November 2011, a claim for compensation was
brought against the United Nations on behalf of victims.' in
response, the Secretary-General informed the claimants'
representatives that the claims are not receivable, pursuant to
United Nations' internal dispute settlement procedures.' These
incidents highlight the relevance of understanding when and how
the United Nations is responsible for tortious conduct.
The jurisdictional immunity of foreign states has a long and
storied history,' with cases dating back to the early nineteenth
century.' The transition from an absolute' to a functional and
restrictive approach has been oft discussed.' In contrast, the
immunity of international organizations and their personnel has
followed a "far darker and mysterious path."'0 When the United
3 See Haiti Cholera Outbreak: Nepal Troops Not Tested, BRIT. BROADCASTING
CORP., Dec. 8, 2010, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-
11949181.
4 Mario Joseph, Brian Concannon & Ira Kurzban, Petition for Relief INSTITUTE
FOR JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY IN HAITI, (Nov. 3, 2011), http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/20 11/1 1/englishpetitionREDACTED.pdf.
5 Press Release, Secretary-General, Haiti Cholera Victims' Compensation Claims
'Not Receivable' Under Immunities And Privileges Convention, United Nations Tells
Their Representatives, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/14828 (Feb. 21, 2013).
6 See, e.g., ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
How WE USE IT 81 (1994) ("There has been a prodigious amount of well-informed
writing on all aspects of the topic of [foreign sovereign] immunity.").
7 The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 3 L. Ed. 287
(1812); The Prins Frederik, 2 Dods, 451, 165 E.R. 15.t3 (High Ct. Adm. 1820); The
Parlement Beige, 5 P.O. 197, (187.t.80) All E.R. Rep. 104 (C.A. 1880).
8 See HIGGINS, supra note 6, at 79; see also Robert P. Lewis, Note, Sovereign
Immunity and International Organizations: Broadbent v. OAS, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON.
675, 688 (1979) (stating that, prior to World War 11, "the policy of granting foreign
sovereigns absolute immunity in national courts was almost universal").
9 See HIGGINS, supra note 6, at 79; Gordon Glenn, Mary Kearney & David
Padilla, Immunities of International Organizations, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 247, 252 (1982);
Antoinette A. Farrugia, Comment, Boimah v. United Nations General Assembly:
International Organizations Immunity Is Absolutely Not Restrictive, 15 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 497, 501 (1989); Frances Wright Henderson, Case Note, How Much Immunity for
International Organizations?: Mendaro v. World Bank, 10 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
487, 490-91 (1985); Lewis, supra note 8, at 677.
10 Charles H. Brower, International Immunities: Some Dissident Views on the Role
of Municipal Courts, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (2000). Juxtaposed with the developed body
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Nations was founded, a functional concept was adopted with
regard to the question of the privileges and immunities that the
Organization should enjoy. Article 105, paragraph 1, of the
Charter of the United Nations ("Charter"), provides that "[t]he
Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members
such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment
of its purposes.""
However, this abstract language required more detailed
explanation to become workable and to assist U.N. officials, as
well as national judges, in determining whether the United Nations
should be considered immune from a particular lawsuit. Similarly,
it was unclear as to what extent U.N. officials should enjoy
privileges and immunities. In Article 105, paragraph 2, the
drafters of the Charter again opted for a functional concept by
providing: "[r]epresentatives of the Members of the United
Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy
such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the
independent exercise of their functions in connection with the
Organization."1 2
There were few legal instruments that could serve as a model
for the immunities envisaged at the time the Charter of the United
Nations was adopted." The Covenant of the League of Nations
of literature on foreign sovereign immunity, leading writers frequently refer to a serious
gap in our understanding of international immunities. See Robert Y. Jennings, Foreword
to PETER BEKKER, THE LEGAL POSITION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: A
FUNCTIONAL NECESSITY ANALYSIS OF THEIR LEGAL STATUS AND IMMUNITIES vii (1994)
(stating that "the gap in our juridical understanding of international organization is a
serious weakness of modem international law"); see also Atkinson v. Inter-American
Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (describing the immunity of
international organizations from judicial process as a "little-known" immunity);
HIGGINS, supra note 6, at 94 (concluding that "[m]ore attention should be paid to the
immunities of international organizations").
II U.N. Charter art. 105, para. 1.
12 U.N Charter art. 105, para. 2.
13 Some earlier international organizations having a political character were
granted diplomatic privileges and immunities including the International Commission for
the Cape Spartal Light, which was created in 1865 and placed a lighthouse near the
Straits of Gibraltar under international administration; the Danube, Congo, and Central
Rhine River Commissions conferred diplomatic immunities in 1878, 1885, and 1922
respectively; and international judicial bodies. See David J. Bederman, The Souls of
International Organizations: Legal Personality and the Lighthouse at Cape Spartal, 36
2014 261
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merely provided for "diplomatic immunities" for League officials
"engaged on the business of the League" 4 and stated that League
property was "inviolable."" Only a subsequent agreement with
the League's host state, the so-called modus vivendi, stipulated
that the League could not "in principle, according to the rules of
international law, be sued before the Swiss Courts without its
consent." 6 Consequently, the privileges and immunities of
international organizations were largely uncharted territory.
It was against this background that the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations ("Convention")
was negotiated and adopted, immediately following the
establishment of the United Nations. 7 With regard to immunity
VA. J. INT'L L. 265, 280-87, 362-63 (1996) (describing the Commission's establishment
and stating that the Commission received "immunity from jurisdiction by any ...
sovereign"); JOHN KERRY KING, THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 39, 44-45, 53-54 (1949) (providing an account of the concession of
immunities to the Danube, Congo, and Central Rhine River Commissions); Serguei
Tarassenko & Ralph Zacklin, Independence of International Civil Servants, in
INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION III 1, 2 (Chris de Cooker ed., 1990) (recounting the
French government's decision in 1922 to confer diplomatic immunities on
representatives and agents of the Central Rhine Commission); KING, supra, at 237
(identifying the Hague Convention for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of 1899 and 1907
as the first example in which diplomatic privileges and immunities were extended to
judges of international tribunals).
14 League of Nations Covenant art. 7, para. 4. Despite the phrase "when engaged
on the business of the League," writers uniformly concluded that the Covenant granted
League officials the full range of diplomatic immunities but limited their application to
the period of an official's appointment. See MARTIN HILL, IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES
OF INTERNATIONAL OFFICIALS 11 (1947); KING, supra note 13, at 78; Yuen-Li Liang, The
Legal Status of the United Nations in the United States, 2 INT'L L.Q. 577, 584 (1948-49);
Tarassenko & Zacklin, supra note 13, at 3.
15 League of Nations Covenant art. 7, para. 5.
16 August Reinisch, Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, in United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law,
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/cpiun-cpisa/cpiun-cpisa e.pdf (quoting
Communications du Conseil F~dral Suisse concernant le Regime des Immunilds
Diplomatique du Personnel de la Socidtd des Nations et du Bureau International du
Travail, entered into by the League of Nations and the Swiss Government (1926), Annex
911a, 1422).
17 Article 105(3) gave the General Assembly the authority to make
recommendations or to propose conventions to define the scope of international
immunities. This, in effect, gave the member states the opportunity to make collective
decisions without "risking litigation to determine whether each measure was 'necessary'
262
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from jurisdiction, the Convention states that "[t]he United Nations,
its property and assets wherever located and by whomsoever held,
shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except
insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its
immunity."' The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") has
confirmed that these provisions grant the United Nations full
immunity from legal process in national courts for any acts
attributable to the organization.19 The status of officials has been
more complicated. The Secretary-General and Assistant
Secretaries-General enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.20
Other civilian staff members receive "functional" immunity from
legal process limited to "words spoken or written and all acts
performed by them in their official capacity."2'
Where peacekeeping forces are working within a "blue-
helmet" operation2 2 under the command and control of the United
Nations, they presumably would be entitled to the immunity
protections afforded other U.N. staff. As a practical matter, the
Status of Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations
("SOFAs") usually includes absolute immunity protection.2 3
These agreements give contributing countries exclusive
jurisdiction to try members of their own forces.24 To remove any
to the United Nations as required by the Charter." Note, The United Nations Under
American Municipal Law: A Preliminary Assessment, 55 YALE L.J. 778, 783 (1946).
18 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations art. 2, § 2,
Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Convention].
19 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of Special Rapporteur of
Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62, 66 (Apr. 29)
[hereinafter Cumaraswamy].
20 Convention, supra note 18, art. 5, § 17.
21 Id. art. 8, § 18.
22 The execution of each of these operations is delegated by the establishing organ,
normally the Security Council but sometimes the General Assembly to the Secretary-
General. The force itself is made up of military personnel voluntarily provided by
member states to the United Nations. This name derives from the blue headgear that is
added to the uniforms of members of national contingents when these become parts of a
U.N. military force. See Paul Szasz, UN Forces and International Humanitarian Law,
75 INT'L L. STUD. SER. US NAVAL WAR COL. 507, 508-9 (2000).
23 U.N. Secretary-General, Draft Model Status of Forces Agreement for Peace-
keeping Operations, 47(b), U.N. Doc. A/45/594 (Oct. 9, 1990) [hereinafter Model
SOFA].
24 See id.
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ambiguity about the status of personnel of the United Nations-
authorized NATO Kosovo Force ("KFOR"), the U.N. Interim
Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK"), Regulation 2000/47 explicitly
granted the forces absolute immunity.2 5
The de facto absolute immunity of the United Nations is
mitigated by Article VIII, Section 29, of the Convention, which
provides that:
The United Nations shall make provisions for appropriate modes
of settlement of:
(a) Disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a
private law character to which the United Nations is a party;
(b) Disputes involving any official of the United Nations who by
reason of his official position enjoys immunity, if immunity has
not been waived by the Secretary-General.26
It is clear that the intention of the drafters was for the United
Nations to be immune from national jurisdiction, only "in order to
avoid litigation in a national court of some other inappropriate
forum; but if [it] cannot resolve a dispute, for example with a tort
claimant, [it] must offer some other suitable means of settling the
matter."27 Private law contracts entered into by the United Nations
regularly contain arbitration clauses.28 Staff disputes within the
United Nations are settled by an internal mechanism in the form of
the United Nations Dispute Tribunal and United Nations Appeals
Tribunal.29
This Article focuses on the thornier situation of tort claims,
where ex ante the parties cannot agree to arbitrate the dispute, and
ex post there is often no competent tribunal.30 Section II addresses
25 S.C. Res. 1244, On the Status, Privileges and Immunities of KFOR and UNMIK
and their Personnel in Kosovo, UNMIK Reg. 2000/47 (Aug. 18, 2000).
26 Convention, supra note 18, art. 8, § 29.
27 Paul Szasz, The United Nations Legislates to Limit its Liability, 81 AM. J. INT'L
L. 739, 739 (1987); see also Alice Ehrenfeld, United Nations Immunity Distinguished
from Sovereign Immunity, 52 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 88, 93 (1958).
28 U.N. Secretary-General, Procedures in Place for the Implementation of Article
VIII, Section 29, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, Adopted by the General Assembly on February 13, 1946, 3-7, U.N. Doc.
A/C.5/49/65 (Apr. 24, 1995) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Report].
29 See U.N. DISPUTE TRIBUNAL, http://www.un.org/en/oaj/dispute/.
30 It should be noted that in many tort cases the U.N. has provided for arbitration
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various methods employed by the United Nations to satisfy its
obligation to provide "appropriate modes of settlement." In
practice, the systems of reparations currently used have significant
drawbacks. This Article then discusses the different avenues by
which plaintiffs have sought recovery when they have been
unsatisfied by the relief provided (or not provided) by the United
Nations.
Section III addresses instances in which plaintiffs have sought
recourse against U.N. officials in domestic courts. In this context,
the courts have generally upheld immunity, based on either the
Convention or domestic implementing legislation. Section IV
investigates situations in which plaintiffs have sought recourse
against nations whose personnel allegedly committed the tortious
conduct while they were members of a U.N. peacekeeping
operation. Problematically, various courts have promulgated
different interpretations of the "effective control" standard for
determining whether an action can be attributed to the troop-
contributing country, the United Nations, or both.
Despite the clear language of the Charter and Convention,
plaintiffs have argued that domestic courts should set aside the
immunity of the United Nations on the basis of the plaintiffs' right
to access a court, as exemplified by the U.S. Constitution, the
European Convention on Human Rights, or the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Section V considers the
worrisome trend of accepting that contention by some European
courts. There are also broader attempts to reformulate U.N.
immunity so that it parallels restricted state immunity. Even
though absolute immunity has been described as an
"anachronism,"' immunity serves a useful and essential purpose,
which is often too easily ignored. Section VI outlines how
immunity protects the functioning and independence of the United
Nations, the lack of familiarity of domestic courts with that
ex post. See Stairways Ltd. v. United Nations reported in 1969 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 233,
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/7 (involving a tort claim in which the United Nations agreed
to arbitration after the dispute arose); Oral Statement of the United Nations (Dec. 10,
1988), 14; Cumaraswamy, supra note 19 (offering to submit defamation claims to
arbitration under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules).
31 Stephen Hertz, International Organizations in the US. Courts: Reconsidering
the Anachronism ofAbsolute Immunity, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.REV. 471 (2008).
2014 265
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
concept, and the failure of domestic courts meaningfully to engage
in comparative international law.3 2 Section VII concludes that the
focus should be on the establishment of effective "appropriate
modes of settlement," instead of attempting to formulate
inconsistent exceptions to the United Nations' immunity.
II. Recourse from the United Nations via "Appropriate Modes
of Settlement"
The Convention requires the United Nations to establish a
dispute settlement procedure for tort claims involving the United
Nations or U.N. officials (if immunity has not been waived).33
However, as early as 1966, a Belgium court noted that, although
the United Nations had adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which provides for an individual's right of due
process, non-compliance with this obligation does not dilute or
repeal the immunity of the United Nations.3 4 Additionally, if any
dispute should arise over the "appropriate modes of settlement"
provided by the United Nations, the only recourse available to an
aggrieved party under the Convention is for the U.N. General
Assembly or Security Council to request an advisory opinion from
the ICJ.35 This circumstance led the Venice Commission to note
bluntly in its Opinion on Human Rights in Kosovo, "[t]here is no
international mechanism of review with respect to acts of UNMIK
and KFOR."3 6
32 Anthea Roberts has termed the seeking to identify and interpret international
law by engaging in comparative analysis of various domestic court decisions as
"comparative international law." See Anthea Roberts, Comparative International Law?
The Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 60 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 57 (2011).
33 Convention, supra note 18, art. 8, § 29.
34 Tribunale de Premiere Instance [Civ.] [Tribunal of First Instance] Brussels, May
11, 1966, 45 ILR 1972, 446 (Beig.).
35 Convention, supra note 18, art. 8, § 30. Though the Convention does not
specify which legal person may make the request, Mahnoush Arsanjani explains,
"[s]tates which may have claims against the U.N. have no direct access to the I.C.J.
They must have the General Assembly or the Security Council request an advisory
opinion." Mahnoush Arsanjani, Claims Against International Organizations: Quis
Custodiet Ipsos Custodies, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 131, 172 (1981). Even this non-
binding system of recourse was challenged by Judge Korma in his dissent from the
above-cited ICJ opinion. Cumaraswamy, supra note 19.
36 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission),
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General Assembly 1998 Resolution 52/247 sets out temporal
and financial limitations applicable to third-party claims against
the Organization for personal injury, illness, or death. It also
provides limitations for property loss or damage resulting from, or
attributable to, the activities of members of peacekeeping
operations in the performance of their official duties.3 7 The
temporal limitation for the submission of claims against the United
Nations was established as six months from the time of the
damage, injury, or loss or from the time it was known by the
claimant.38 In any case, the Resolution required that claims be
brought no later than one year after the termination of the mandate
of the operation.39 Compensation for personal injury, illness, or
death was limited to economic loss, measured by local standards,
not to exceed $50,000.40 Compensation for property loss or
damage was also limited.4'
In the same resolution, the Assembly endorsed the view of the
U.N. Secretary-General that liability does not attach to third-party
claims resulting from, or attributable to, the activities of members
of peacekeeping operations arising from "operational necessity."
It also endorsed the view of the Secretary-General that the United
Nations cannot limit its responsibility when members of a
peacekeeping operation, while performing their duties, commit a
wrongful act wilfully, or with a criminal intent, or because of
gross negligence, as the Organization is justified in seeking
recovery from the individual or from the troop-contributing state
concerned precisely because of that element of gross fault or
wilful or criminal intent.43 SOFAs that came into force following
Opinion on Human Rights in Kosovo: Possible Establishment of Review Mechanisms,
75, No. 280/2004 (Oct. 8-9, 2004) [hereinafter Venice Commission] (original emphasis).
37 See generally G.A. Res. 52/247, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/247 (June 26, 1998).
38 Id 8.
39 Id. 9.
40 Noneconomic loss such as pain and suffering was excluded. Id.
41 Id. T 10.
42 G.A. Res. 52/247, 6; see also U.N. Secretary-General, Administrative and
Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:
Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 14, U.N. Doc. A/51/389
(Sept. 20, 1996) [hereinafter Secretary-General's 1996 Peacekeeping Budget Report].
43 Id. T 7; see also U.N. Secretary-General, Administrative and Budgetary Aspects
2014 267
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the adoption of Resolution 52/247 include a reference to the
resolution and its provisions.44
Pursuant to its obligations under Section 29 of the Convention,
the United Nations provides in Article 51 of its 1990 Model Status
of Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations ("Model
SOFA") that:
[A]ny dispute or claim of a private law character to which the
United Nations peace-keeping operation or any member thereof
is a party and over which the courts of [host country/territory]
do not have jurisdiction . .. shall be settled by a standing claims
commission to be established for that purpose. One member of
the commission shall be appointed by the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, one member by the Government and a
chairman jointly by the Secretary-General and the
Goverment .... [A]ll decisions shall require the approval of
any two members. The awards of the commission shall be final
and binding, unless the Secretary-General of the United Nations
and the Government permit an appeal ....
As the template for individual agreements between the United
Nations and the state(s) in which peacekeepers are to be deployed,
the Model SOFA outlines the core rights and obligations of
peacekeeping forces. However, despite recognizing the Article 51
standing-claims commissions as the only independent avenue for
recourse against the United Nations,4 6 the Secretary-General has
repeatedly acknowledged that no such commission has ever been
established.4 7
of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Financing of the
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, f 14, U.N. Doe. A/51/903 (May 21, 1997)
[hereinafter Secretary-General's 1997 Peacekeeping Budget Report].
44 Larry D. Johnson, Introductory Note to Brzak v. United Nations (2d Cir.) and
Mothers of Srebrenica v. The Netherlands & United Nations (Neth. App. Ct.), 49 ILM
1011, 1014 (2010).
45 Model SOFA, supra note 23, T 51.
46 Secretary-General's 1997 Peacekeeping Budget Report, supra note 43, 10;
Secretary-General's 1996 Peacekeeping Budget Report, supra note 42, $T 20-21.
47 Secretary-General's 1997 Peacekeeping Budget Report, supra note 43, 1 8;
Secretary-General's 1996 Peacekeeping Budget Report, supra note 42, T 22; Dispute
Settlement Report, supra note 28, T 17; see also Daphna Shraga, U.N. Peacekeeping
Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for
Operations-Related Damage, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 406, 409 (2000).
268 Vol. XXXIX
UNITED NATIONS TORT LIABILITY
An instructive example is the claims brought on behalf of over
5,000 plaintiffs, filed under the SOFA between the United Nations
and Haiti, alleging that the United Nations negligently introduced
a cholera epidemic in Haiti. The United Nations rejected the
demand, arguing that:
With respect to the claims submitted, consideration of these
claims would necessarily include a review of political and policy
matters. Accordingly, these claims are not receivable pursuant
to Section 29 of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations, adopted by the General
Assembly on 13 February 1946.49
Their position appears to be that the dispute is of a public,
rather than private law character. Therefore, they are not required
to "make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement" under
Section 29 of the Convention.so However, one of the problems of
the distinction between public and private claims is that, due to the
"internal, confidential and unilateral" character of the review
boards' procedure, the United Nations has never provided a clear
definition of public or private.'
The Secretary-General has clarified that claims of a private
nature primarily include "claims for compensation submitted by
48 Mario Joseph, Brian Concannon & Ira Kurzban, Petition for Relief INSTITUTE
FOR JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY IN HAITI, (Nov. 3, 2011), http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11 /englishpetitionREDACTED.pdf.
49 Letter from the U.N. Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs to Brian
Concannon (Feb. 1, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/wp-content/uploads[LettertoMr.Brian
Concannon.pdf
50 Convention, supra note 18, art. 8, § 29. The U.N. guide to practice also rejects
claims of a public law character, noting that:
The Organization does not agree to engage in litigation or arbitration with the numerous
third parties that submit claims (often seeking substantial monetary compensation) based
on political or policy-related grievances against the United Nations, usually related to
actions or decisions taken by the Security Council or the General Assembly in respect of
certain matters. Such claims, in many instances, consist of rambling statements
denouncing the policies of the Organization and alleging that specific actions of the
General Assembly or the Security Council have caused the claimant to sustain financial
losses. The Secretary-General considers that it would be inappropriate to utilize public
funds to submit to any form of litigation with the claimants to address such issues.
Dispute Settlement Report, supra note 28, 1 23.
51 Frid6ric Mgret, La Responsabilite Des Nations Unies Aux Temps Du Cholera
(forthcoming).
2014 269
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
third parties for personal injury or death and/or property loss or
damage incurred as a result of acts committed by members of a
United Nations peace-keeping operation within the 'mission area'
concerned."52 In the Haiti cholera claims, many elements of a
"dispute of a private law character" would appear to be present.
The claim itself was essentially one of tort, the claimants were
private individuals, and the remedy sought was monetary
compensation. The Human Rights Advisory Panel, established to
review human rights violations committed by UNMIK, determined
that complaints of human rights violations involving personal
injury, illness or death nonetheless constituted dispute of a private
law character."
However, the United Nations' denial appears to be consistent
with their previous response to mass tort claims. Claims brought
on behalf of some 864 members of the Roma, Ashkali, and
Egyptian community in Kosovo, who alleged that they suffered
lead poising as a result of lead contamination in the Internally
Displaced Persons camps in north Mitrovica, were rebuffed. In
similar fashion to the Haiti cholera claims, they were informed
that compensation was provided only with respect to "claims of a
private law character," whereas the complainants' claims
concerned "alleged widespread health and environmental risks
arising in the context of the precarious security situation in
Kosovo."54 In both instances, the United Nations' determination
cannot be appealed and the claimants have no United Nations'
claims process to pursue their case.
In the absence of a standing claims commission, those seeking
to bring claims against the United Nations for torts associated with
peacekeeping operations have been left with highly problematic
and inadequate alternative modes of settlement.
52 Dispute Settlement Report, supra note 28, T 15.
53 Case No. 26/08 N.M. and Others against UNMIK, Decision of the Human
Rights Advisory Panel (Mar. 31, 2010)
54 Letter from the U.N. Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs to Leigh Day &
Co. (July 25, 2011). See Case No. 26/08 N.M. and Others against UNMIK, Decision of
the Human Rights Advisory Panel (June 10, 2012).
55 Tom Dannenbaum, Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System
of Effective Accountability: How Liability Should be Apportioned for Violations of
Human Rights by Member State Troops Contingents Serving as United Nations
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The first and most common alternative 5 6 is the internal United
Nations "local claims review board,", 7 which the Secretary-
General has described as leaving "the investigation, processing
and final adjudication of the claims entirely in the hands of the
Organization."" Claims under this procedure are brought to
panels of three or more U.N. staff members for disposition."
Therefore, the remedy tends to be much more internal and
institutionalized than the original claim commission model
anticipated.
There are three major flaws with internal claims review
boards. First, the power held by the United Nations as adjudicator
of the claim is incompatible with a fair process, given its status as
one of the parties to the dispute. 60  This led the Venice
Commission to demand "a system of independent review of
UNMIK and KFOR acts for conformity with international human
rights standards to be established as a matter of urgency."6 1 The
fact that the boards' rulings are not made public augments this
issue.62 Second, while review boards are designed to be
established on the commencement of a peacekeeping operation, in
practice they are "set up [by the United Nations] when [it
determines that] the need arises."63 This creates the risk that
claimants may be denied a forum when they initially try to bring a
claim, with the claimant further reliant on the stronger party from
Peacekeepers, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 113, 126 (2010).
56 Shraga, supra note 47 (noting that review boards have been established for
almost every peacekeeping operation).
57 Secretary-General's 1996 Peacekeeping Budget Report, supra note 42, 22.
58 See Secretary-General's 1996 Peacekeeping Budget Report, supra note 42, 1
20.
59 Fr6d6ric Mgret, The Vicarious Responsibility of the United Nations, in
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 250, 261-62 (Chiyuki Aoi,
Cedric de Coning & Ramesh Thakur eds., 2007).
60 See id. at 263; Arsanjani, supra note 35, at 145.
61 Venice Commission, supra note 36,196.
62 Mgret, supra note 59, at 262. This lack of transparency has provoked scathing
criticism from Kosovo's Ombudsperson. Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Third
Annual Report, addressed to Mr. Michael Steiner, Special Representative of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, 2, UNMIK 17.1 (July 10, 2003).
63 Secretary-General's 1996 Peacekeeping Budget Report, supra note 42, T 25.
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whom it is seeking reparations.6 For example, two years after the
Security Council authorized UNMIK and KFOR, there were no
functioning claims procedures for either body." Third, as the
number of claims made against the United Nations has grown over
the years, the review boards have, in the words of the Secretary-
General, experienced "growing backlogs and longer delays in the
settlement of claims,"6 resulting in "a significant number of
claims remaining unresolved at the end of the [review boards']
liquidation period" after the termination of the U.N. mission.67
The second alternative to the Article 51 claims commission is
a process whereby the United Nations settles the claims en masse
through negotiation with the host government,68 which then
distributes the agreed lump sum to individual claimants however it
deems equitable.69  Advantages of the en masse negotiation
alternative include efficiency and expediency of settlement, as
well as limitation of financial liability.7 0 However, there are also
serious deficiencies in this approach.
First, an effective remedy depends largely on a host
government that has the capacity and nous to pursue a successful
negotiation with the United Nations. As the Secretary-General has
acknowledged, "[t]he choice of a lump-sum settlement as a mode
of handling third-party claims is largely dependent on the State's
willingness to espouse the claims of its nationals."7 1 States hosting
peacekeepers may not have institutions ready to launch such a
relatively complicated process or simply may have little regard for
64 Dannenbaum, supra note 55, at 127.
65 Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, First Annual Report, addressed to Mr.
Hans Haekkerup, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
11, UNMIK 17.1 (July 18, 2001).
66 Secretary-General's 1996 Peacekeeping Budget Report, supra note 42, T 26.
67 See id T 28.
68 See id 1 34.
69 See id; U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Feb. 20, 1965 from the Secretary-
General of the United Nations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs for Belgium,
Concerning the Settlement of Claims Lodged Against ONUC by Belgian Nationals,
Annex 1, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/6597 (Feb. 20, 1965) (stipulating that "[t]he distribution to be
made of the sum referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be the responsibility of the
Belgian Government").
70 Secretary-General's 1996 Peacekeeping Budget Report, supra note 42, 35.
71 See id. 37.
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the interests of their citizens.72 Thus, the leading examples of
successful en masse claims negotiations are those that were
conducted not by host governments but by Belgium, Switzerland,
Greece, Luxembourg, and Italy following harms inflicted on their
citizens by the United Nations Operation in the Congo ("ONUC")
in the 1960s.73 More typically, Somalia in the 1990s failed in its
"responsibility .. . to seek redress [from the United Nations] for
the harms suffered by its own citizens . . . [m]ost likely as a result
of the lack of an organized government in Mogadishu. . . ."7 4
Second, even when a payment is made, the process is dependent
on the government's willingness and capacity to distribute fairly
the agreed sums among the individual claimants." This is
particularly problematic in post-conflict scenarios where the
populace might be divided or unstable.7 6
Partly in response to growing concerns about abuses by U.N.
staff and the lack of transparency of U.N. field missions generally,
Ombudsperson offices have been the main vehicle established at
the mission level to resolve claims of abuse. In recent years,
both the Secretary-General" and DPKO's Lessons Learned Unit"
72 Mgret, supra note 59, at 264.
73 See, e.g., Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 59th Sess., May 7-June 5; July 9-
Aug.10, 2007, U.N. Doc. A/62/10; GAOR, 62nd Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2007); Secretary-
General's 1996 Peacekeeping Budget Report, supra note 42, 136; MOSHE HIRSCH, THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TOWARD THIRD PARTIES: SOME
BASIC PRINCIPLES 69-70 (1995).
74 Mark Gibney, Katarina Tomagevski & Jens Vedsted-Hansen, Transnational
State Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, 12 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 267, 280
(1999).
75 Dannenbaum, supra note 55, at 128.
76 Id.
77 The Lessons Learned Unit in its evaluation of United Nations Operations in
Somalia found that the lack of transparency and non-existence of a complaints
mechanism led to the perception among the local population that mission personnel were
above the law. See Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Comprehensive Report on
Lessons Learned from United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), April 1992-
March 1995, 57.
78 In a 1999 report, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council
"[s]upport a public 'ombudsman' within all peacekeeping operations to deal with
complaints from the general public." U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-
General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts,
Recommendation 31, U.N. Doc. S/1999/957 (Sept. 8, 1999).
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have consistently recommended the establishment of an
Ombudsperson office as an essential part of current and future
missions. However, a lack of enforcement power and material
support at the mission level has rendered the Ombudsperson an
ineffective institution.o For example, Kosovo's Ombudsperson's
powers were essentially limited to making recommendations,
including that disciplinary or criminal proceedings be instituted
against a person."' If these recommendations were ignored
without good reason, the office's only recourse was to "draw the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General's attention to the
matter" or make a public statement.8 2 The Ombudsperson in East
Timor was even more limited in scope and was generally seen as
unsuccessful." Given their inability to award compensation for
private law claims against the United Nations, the Ombudspersons
in Kosovo and East Timor cannot be seen as satisfying the Section
29 obligation for "appropriate modes of settlement."
III.Recourse against United Nations Officials in Domestic
Courts
Whether a U.N. civilian staff member is protected by
immunity is likely to hinge on the interpretation of Charter Article
105's "necessary for the independent exercise of their functions"84
79 See Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Comprehensive Report on Lessons
Learned from United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), April 1992-March
1995; Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons
From Recent Experiences, at 40 (Dec. 1996).
80 Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not to Waive: Immunity and Accountability in
U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 18 CONN. J. INT'L L. 103, 115 (2002).
81 UNMIK Reg. 2000/38 makes it clear that the office of the Ombudsperson is not
a court and that, while the office may intervene with authorities and recommend the
suspension of administrative decisions, its power ultimately rests in the ability to make
recommendations to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The
Ombudsperson can recommend that an administrative decision be suspended only where
there is a danger of "irreparable prejudice." Id. § 4.6. Additionally, the Special-
Representative of the Secretary-General may remove the Ombudsperson for such
ambiguous reasons as "failure in the execution of his or her functions" and "having been
placed ... in a position incompatible with the due exercise of his or her functions." Id. §
8.2.
82 Id. § 4.11.
83 SIMON CHESTERMAN, You, THE PEOPLE 149-50 (2004).
84 U.N. Charter art. 105, para. 2.
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and Convention Section 18's "in their official capacity."" A
broad interpretation would make any activity in the field de facto
"official" and offer the most rigorous protection, while a narrow
interpretation would provide protection only for those actions that
could reasonably be considered "official" or "necessary."
It is almost certain that the drafters intended the Convention to
provide broad protection.86 The Sixth Committee considered and
rejected interpretations of Charter Article 105 that would narrow
protections to those actions "indispensible to achieving the
organization's purpose."87 The U.N. Office of Legal Affairs
("OLA") has also rejected an interpretation of the Convention that
would deny immunity where staff violated the Standard of
Conduct of International Civil Servants by participating in
political activity." There is also reason to believe that the ICJ
would interpret the Convention's provisions to provide maximum
protection. For example, the Court in Mazilu8 9 noted that Article
85 Convention, supra note 18, art. 5, § 18(a)
86 Rawski, supra note 80, at 111.
87 The most notable being the interpretation of the judge in Donnelly v. Ranollo, a
case in the City Court of New Rochelle, New York, predating the Convention. The
chauffer of then Secretary-General Trygve Lie was stopped for a speeding violation.
Immunity was claimed based on Article 105 of the Charter. The court interpreted the
Charter language narrowly and held that immunity should only be granted to personnel
"whose activities are such as to be necessary to the actual execution of the purposes and
deliberations of the United Nations," a reading which did not include chauffeurs and
household servants at all. Westchester County v. Ranollo, 67 N.Y.S.2d 31, 35 (New
Rochelle City Ct. 1946). Notably, the court also cited the fact that while diplomats who
claim immunity are subject to trial and punishment in their home country, the United
Nations does not have a tribunal to punish its own personnel who are protected by
immunity. See id. at 34. The Sixth Committee took the case into account when making
recommendations on the draft of the Convention.
88 In 1998, when the government of Ethiopia requested that locally recruited
Eritrean U.N. staff accused of spying leave the country, the Office of Legal Affairs made
it clear that any action against those staff would be a violation of U.N. privileges and
immunities. See Press Release, United Nations, Gen. for Human Res. tells Fifth Comm.,
U.N. Doc. GA/AB/3275 (Dec. 1, 1998). Ethiopia claimed that the staff members in
question were spying on behalf of Eritrean clandestine networks and that privileges and
immunities did not apply when members' activities violated the Standards of Conduct in
International Civil Service ban on political activities. Press Release, United Nations,
Many U.N. Staff from Rwanda Currently Under Arrest are Suspected of Participating in
1994 Genocide, Fifth Comm. Told, U.N. Doc. GA/AB/3277 (Dec. 7, 1998).
89 Applicability of Article VI, Section 22 of Convention on Privileges and
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105 of the Charter and Section 22 of the Convention protected all
persons "to whom a mission has been entrusted by the
Organization" and broadly interpreted the "whole period of such
mission[]" so that privileges and immunities would apply
regardless of "whether or not they travel."90 This is consistent
with the Court's conservative approach to diplomatic immunity
generally.9'
While it is clear that the Secretary-General has the sole
authority to waive immunity, it is not as clear whether the
Secretary-General alone can make the determination of whether
immunity initially applies.9 2 This was the issue in Cumaraswamy,
where defamation suits were brought against the Commission on
Human Rights' Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges
and Lawyers.9 3 The Secretary-General issued a note confirming
that "the words which constitute the basis of plaintiffs' complaint
in this case were spoken by the Special Rapporteur in the course of
his mission" and that therefore, with respect to those words, the
Special Rapporteur was "immune from legal process." 9 4 However,
a judge of the Malaysian High Court for Kuala Lumpur concluded
that she was "unable to hold that the Defendant is absolutely
protected by the immunity he claims," in part because she
considered that the Secretary-General's note was merely "an
opinion" with scant probative value and no binding force upon the
court.95 The Convention states that "all differences arising out of
Immunities of United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1989 I.C.J. 177 (Dec. 15), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/8 1/6813.pdf.
90 Id., 152
91 See Arrest Warrant of II April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Beig.), Judgment,
2002 I.C.J. 3, 51-55 (Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/121/8126.pdf. In the Arrest Warrant case, the court held that the
threat of criminal prosecution would be an impediment to the Minister's "performance of
his or her duties" and therefore, violate immunity protection under customary
international law. Id. 54.
92 See Cumaraswamy, supra note 19, T 60 (noting that it is up to the Secretary-
General "to assess whether its agents acted within the scope of their functions" and then
"inform the Government of a member State of his finding" so that the State can act
accordingly when such agent's acts have given rise to court proceedings).
93 Id. T 5.
94 Id. T 6.
95 MBf Capital Bhd & Anor v. Dato Param Cumaraswamy, (1997) 3 MLJ 300.
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the interpretation or application of the present convention shall be
referred to the International Court of Justice."9 6 Therefore, when
further discussions did not produce agreement, the Economic and
Social Council, at the request of the Secretary-General, sought an
advisory opinion on the matter.97
In Cumaraswamy, the ICJ stated that the Secretary-General
has the right and duty to protect U.N. personnel and the missions
they undertake.9 8 Thus, the Secretary-General plays a "pivotal
role" in any immunity determination. 99  However, the court
rejected the position consistently advanced by the United Nations
that, subject to review by the ICJ, the Secretary-General's
characterization of an act enjoys conclusive effect in domestic
courts.'o The Court concluded that the Secretary-General's
determination with respect to immunity creates a presumption, to
which domestic courts must accord "the greatest weight" and
which they may set aside only "for the most compelling
reasons." 0 ' However, it is important to note that this comment in
obitor leaves open the possibility that a national court could set
aside set the Secretary-General's findings.02
Vice-President Weeramantry elaborated in a separate opinion,
contrasting the institutional competencies of domestic courts and
of the Secretary-General in making determinations regarding
immunity.'o3 In particular, he suggested that domestic courts
96 Convention, supra note 18, art. 8, § 30.
97 U.N. ESCOR, 49th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. 1998/297 (Aug. 5, 1998), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/dec/1998/edecl 998-297.htm. It is important to
note that ICJ advisory opinions, which are generally only consultative in character, "shall
be accepted as decisive by the parties." Convention, supra note 19, art. 8, § 30.
98 Cumaraswamy, supra note 19, 1 50-5 1.
99 Id. 150.
100 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of
the Commission on Human Rights: Written Statement Submitted on Behalf of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1998 I.C.J. 1, 1 56 (Oct. 2), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/100/8658.pdf.
101 Cumaraswamy, supra note 19, 1 61.
102 See, e.g., id % 61-62 (showing that Secretary-General's findings were not
applied on the issue of immunity in Malaysia's courts, but only because the Government
of Malaysia failed to transmit the Secretary-General's finding to the "competent courts"
and thus failed to comply with its obligation under the Charter and General Convention).
103 Id. at 92 (separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry).
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should not exercise primary decision-making authority because
they might allow "[1]ocally sensitive issues [to] crowd out
perspectives regarding the global norms applicable to such
situations."l0 Cases such as Cumaraswamy demonstrate that,
contrary to the suggestion of some academics, the fear of prejudice
is neither "unrealistic" nor "exaggerated."'o In contrast, "[t]he
Secretary-General is better informed than" domestic authorities
regarding "the limits of a given agent's functions . .. and the needs
of the United Nations in relation to any particular inquiry."' 06
Additionally, the Secretary-General has a unique perspective on
"the entire scheme of United Nations operations" and "more than
any other authority, can assess a given agent's functions within the
overall context of the rationale, traditions and operational
framework of the United Nations activities as a whole." 07
Despite the clear wording of the Convention and the deference
given to the Secretary-General's determination in Cumaraswamy,
plaintiffs have sought to limit the immunity of the United Nations
and its officials. However, "in the near-totality of cases national
courts scrupulously stick to the U.N.'s immunity."'s Many
domestic legal systems contain express legislation that grants
immunity from suit to international organizations either in general
or to specific organizations." Among the most well-known are
the U.S.'s International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945110
104 Id. at 95 (separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry).
105 See Michael Singer, Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organizations:
Human Rights and Functional Necessity Concerns, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 53, 128 (1995-
1996) (describing the likelihood of prejudice as "unrealistic"); Daniel Hammerschlag,
Comment, Morgan v. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 16 MD. J.
INT'L L. & TRADE 279, 296 (1992) (referring to foreign policy concerns as
"exaggerated").
106 Cumaraswamy, supra note 19, at 96 (separate opinion of Vice-President
Weeramantry).
107 Id. at 97 (separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry).
108 Jan Wouters & Pierre Schmitt, Challenging Acts of Other United Nations'
Organs, Subsidiary Organs, and Officials, in CHALLENGING ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS 77, 83 (August Reinisch ed., 2010).
109 See, e.g., International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b)
(2013).
110 International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (2013)
(providing that "International organizations, their property and assets, wherever located,
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and the U.K.'s International Organisations Act 1968."'
Frequently, courts expressly rely on the relevant domestic
legislation even in cases where international sources may be
directly applicable in the domestic legal order.1 2  In dualist
systems, with a clear separation between international and
domestic law, courts are bound to rely on domestic implementing
legislation."3
A recent exemplar of this approach is Brzak v. United Nations,
where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
dismissal of a sex discrimination suit by two U.N. employees
against the United Nations and three of its former senior officials:
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan; U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, Rund Lubbers; and Lubbers's deputy, Wendy
Chamberlain."' The U.S. district court found that the United
and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form of
judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such
organization may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or
by the terms of any contract").
III International Organisations Act, 1968, c. 48, § 1, sch. 2 (U.K.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/48/pdfs/ukpga 19680048_en.pdf (providing
that "Her Majesty may Order in Council . . . provide that the organisation shall, to such
extent as may be specified in the Order, have the privileges and immunities set out in
Part I of Schedule I of this Act"). Part I of Schedule I to the International Organisations
Act 1968 lists among others, "Immunity from suit and legal process." Id. at 11.
112 According to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 467 cmt. f (1987), the immunities provisions in the Convention are
"probably self-executing" and consequently "to be given effect even without legislative
implementation." See also Curran v. City of New York, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206, 212 (S. Ct.
1947) (holding that since the U.S. was a party to the U.N. Charter, the provision of
Article 105 "in a Treaty made under the authority of the United States, [is] the law of the
land" and that immunity from taxation was included in the "immunities necessary for the
fulfilment of [the U.N.'s] purposes"); United States v. Coplon, 84 F.Supp. 472, 474
(S.D.N.Y. 1949) (denying defendant's claim of diplomatic immunity when espionage
was found not to fall within the category of acts performed in the official capacity of
U.N. officials and employees).
113 For instance, the two Indian cases were decided on the basis of the Indian
immunity legislation, the United Nations (Privileges and Immunities) Act 1947. Matthew
v. International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) and the
Government of India, 1982 A.I.R. (AP) (an employment dispute dismissed by an Indian
court); Sharma v. UNDP Regional Manager, South Asia, Office of the Labour
Commissioner, Delhi Administration, Oct. 10, 1983 (administrative labor proceedings
dismissed by the Indian Labour Department).
114 Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107, 107 (2d Cir. 2010).
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Nations was absolutely immune from suit and that individual
defendants had functional immunity."' The plaintiffs appealed,
contending that the Convention is not self-executing." 6 The court
of appeals affirmed the lower court, finding that the Convention is
self-executing, bars all suits against the United Nations, and bars
suits against former high officials for acts "performed in the
exercise of their United Nations functions."" 7
The plaintiffs were Brzak, a U.S. citizen, and Ishak, a French-
Egyptian dual-national, employed by the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") in Geneva,
Switzerland."' Brzak alleged that during a meeting of UNHCR
staff members in Geneva in 2003, "she was grabbed in a sexual
manner by Lubbers."" 9 On advice of Ishak, Brzak filed a
complaint with the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight
Services, which then issued a report that confirmed these
allegations against Lubbers.120  Brzak, however, alleged that
Secretary-General Annan ultimately disregarded the report's
findings and eventually exonerated Lubbers.12' The plaintiffs
alleged that, as a consequence of Brzak's complaint and Ishak's
assistance in pursuing it, U.N. officials retaliated against them by
manipulating Brzak's work assignments and denying Ishak
merited promotions.122 The plaintiffs sued, alleging sex
discrimination and retaliation contrary to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,123 violations of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act,124 and state common law torts.125
Upon considering the United Nations' contention of absolute
115 Brzak v. United Nations, 551 F. Supp. 2d 313, 318-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
116 Brzak, 597 F.3d at 110.
117 Id. at 112-13.
118 Brzak, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 315.
''9 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2013).
124 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(2013).
125 Brzak, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 315 (alleging causes of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress and indecent battery).
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immunity, the court referred first to Article II, section 2 of the
Convention, which provides that the United Nations enjoys
immunity from "every form of legal process" unless it is
"expressly waived."' 26  The plaintiffs argued that, as a matter of
domestic law, the Convention cannot be enforced by U.S. courts
absent additional legislation, because it is not self-executing,127
citing the Supreme Court case, Medellin v. Texas.'2 8 The court,
having examined the text of the Convention, recalled its
ratification history, and accorded "great weight" to the views of
the executive branch; it concluded that the Convention is self-
executing and applies in U.S. courts without implementing
legislation.129  This was an "important finding for the future
implementation and application of the General Convention in U.S.
courts."'
30
The Second Circuit found additional support for the United
Nations' immunity in the International Organizations Immunities
Act ("IOIA"),"' which provides that "international organizations
designated by the President receive the 'same immunity from suit
and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign
governments.""' 3 2  The plaintiffs contended that the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"),13 3 which strips foreign states
of their immunity in certain circumstances, narrowed the United
Nations' immunity under the IOIA.'34 The court was not
persuaded, inter alia, because the plaintiffs failed to show, in
district court or on appeal, how their complaint fell under any of
126 Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
127 Id.
128 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (holding that pertinent international
agreements were not self-executing and did not provide for direct enforcement of ICJ
judgments in a state court, thereby emphasizing the power of Congress to give such
treaties a domestic effect).
129 Brzak, 597 F.3dat 111-12.
130 Johnson, supra note 44, at 1012.
131 International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a (2013) (detailing
the privileges, exemptions, and immunities of international organizations).
132 Brzak, 597 F.3d at 112 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b)). The United Nations was
designated such protection under the International Organizations Immunities Act in
1946. Id at 112.
133 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (2013).
134 Brzak, 597 F.3d at 112.
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the exceptions to immunity in the FSIA.'
Moving to the claim against three former U.N. senior officials,
the court noted that Article V, section 19 of the Convention
entitled U.N. officials of senior rank to the same privileges and
immunities as diplomatic envoys. 13 6  Therefore, when the three
alleged individuals worked for the United Nations, they were
entitled to absolute immunity from civil and criminal process
under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations.'37 After their employment ended, Article 39(2) of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations entitled them to
immunity only "with respect to acts performed by such a person in
the exercise of his functions" as a diplomat. 13 8 The key issue was
whether the plaintiffs' allegations involved "acts that the
defendants performed in the exercise of their [U.N.] functions."' 3 9
The court declared "when a court attempts to determine whether a
defendant is seeking immunity 'with respect to acts performed by
such a person in the exercise of his functions,' the court must do
so without judging whether the underlying conduct actually
occurred, or whether it was wrongful."l 40 However, the court did
not discuss the relevance of the Secretary-General's determination,
which Cumaraswamy held should be accorded "the greatest
weight."l41
Of the seven claims, the 'court concluded that all but one
regarded "acts that the defendants performed in exercise of their
official functions, namely, their management of the office in
135 Id. (rejecting also plaintiffs' claim because whatever the limits on sovereign
immunity by FSIA on international organizations, the CPIUN "unequivocally grants the
United Nations absolute immunity without exception"); see also Atkinson v. Inter-
American Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335, 1340-42 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting the argument
for a narrower definition of state immunity under the IOIAA to international
organizations by noting that the State Department followed a restrictive theory and made
suggestions of immunity in appropriate cases).
136 Brzak, 597 F.3d at 113.
137 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31, Apr. 24, 1964, 500
U.N.T.S. 95, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
conventions/9_1_1961.pdf.
138 Id. art. 39(2).
139 Brzak, 597 F.3d at 113.
140 Id.
141 See Cumaraswamy, supra note 19, T 61.
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which the plaintiffs worked." 42 Thus, immunity was upheld for
those six allegations.'4 3 This follows a long line of U.S. domestic
court precedents holding that functional immunity applies to
employment-related suits against officials of international
organizations.144 As for the remaining claim concerning the
improper touching or grabbing in a sexual manner, the court stated
that, as Brzak's federal claims had been dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds, there was "no colorable basis for the
district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over [Brzak's]
state law claim." 45 The court concluded that "Brzak is free to re-
file her battery claim in the state courts" but that, "if she did so,
the state court would need to adjudicate in the first instance the
defendant's claim of immunity."1 46
IV. Recourse against Troop-Contributing Countries in
Domestic Courts
Given the difficulty immunity presents in maintaining a cause
of action against the United Nations or U.N. officials, plaintiffs
have sought to obtain compensation from the troop-contributing
countries of peacekeeping operations. However, the European
Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") took a highly restrictive
approach in the joined cases of Behrami v. France and Saramati v.
France, regarding the attribution of the conduct of military
personnel involved in operations under United Nations auspices.147
Behrami was almost universally criticized by legal commentators
142 Brzak, 597 F.3d at 113.
"43 Id.
144 Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Broadbent v. Org.
of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Morgan v. Int'l Bank for Reconstr. &
Dev., 752 F. Supp. 492, 492 (D.D.C. 1990).
145 Brzak, 597 F.3d at 114.
146 Id. See also, e.g., Swarna v. AI-Awadi, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51908
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (granting plaintiffs motion for default judgment with respect to her
claims against a former diplomat and his wife, thereby rejecting defendant's claim of
immunity); Baoanan v. Baja, 627 F. Supp. 2d. 155, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying
defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs claim, thereby rejecting the immunity of a
former U.N. diplomat, his wife, and his adult daughter).
147 Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, App. Nos. 71412/01, 78166/01, 45 Eur.
H.R. Rep. SE10 (2007), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.
aspx?i=001-80830.
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for being wrong both as a matter of law and as a matter of
policy.148  In contrast, the recent cases of Al-Jedda,149 in the
ECtHR and Nuhanovi6 and Mustafid-Mujiso in the Dutch Court
of Appeal, have greatly broadened the scope for claims against
troop-contributing countries.
The Behrami case, filed against France, concerned the death of
a young boy and a serious injury inflicted on his brother in Kosovo
in March 2000, resulting from the detonation of a cluster bomb
dropped by North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") forces
in 1999.'"' The applicants argued that the incident occurred
because of the failure of French KFOR troops to mark or defuse
undetonated bombs which those troops knew to be present on the
site in question.15 2  The complaint was based on European
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms ("ECHR") Article 2 ("Right to Life").' The Saramati
case, against Norway and France, concerned the arrest of the
applicant by UNMIK police in April 2001 and his extra-judicial
detention by KFOR from July of that year through to the following
148 See, e.g., Caitlin Bell, Reassessing Multiple Attribution: The International Law
Commission and the Behrami and Saramati Decisions, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 501
(2009-2010); Aurel Sari, Jurisdiction and International Responsibility in Peace Support
Operations: The Behrami and Saramati Cases, 8 HuM. RTS. L. REV. 51 (2008); Kjetil
Mujezinovic Larsen, Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations: The 'Ultimate
Authority and Control' Test, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 509 (2008); Paolo Palchetti, Azioni di
forze istutuite o autorizzate dalle Nazioni Unite davanti all Corte europea dei diritti
dell'uomo: i casi Behrami e Saramati, 90 RIVISTA DI DIRITro INTERNAZIONALE, 681, 686-
87 (2007); Marko Milanovid & Tatjana Papid, As Bad As It Gets: The European Court of
Human Rights' Behrami and Saramati Decision and General International Law, 58
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 267 (2009).
149 Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-105612.
150 Mustafic-Mujic v. Netherlands, Ca. No. 200.020.173/01 (July 5, 2011),
available at http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHSGR:
2011 :BR5386.
151 Behrami, supra note 147, 5.
152 Id. 61.
153 Pierre Bodeau-Livinec, Gionata P. Buzzini & Santiago Villalpando, Behrami &
Behrami v. France; Saramati v. France, Germany & Norway: ECHR Judgment on
Applicability of European Convention on Human Rights to Acts Undertaken Pursuant to
UN Chapter VII Operation in Kosovo, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 323, 323 (2008).
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January. 5 4 The applicant claimed that he had been arrested and
detained by order of the KFOR commander.' 55 With regard to his
detention, the applicant sued under Article 5 ("Right to Liberty
and Security") of the ECHR, alone and in conjunction with Article
13 ("Right to an Effective Remedy"), and, with regard to his lack
of court access, on Article 6 ("Right to a Fair Trial").15 6
The first matters determined by the court was that issuing
detention orders fell within the mandate of KFOR and that the
supervision of de-mining fell within UNMIK's mandate.'5 ' The
court then examined whether the impugned action of KFOR
(detention in Saramati) and inaction of UNMIK (failure to de-
mine in Behrami) could be attributable to the United Nations.'15 In
this context, the court preliminarily explained that it intended to
use the term "attribution" in the same way as Article 3 (now
Article 4) of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of
International Organisations ("Draft Articles"),159 as adopted by the
International Law Commission ("ILC") on second reading in
201 1.160
With regard to the detention in the Saramati case, the
applicants argued that KFOR soldiers' conduct was not
attributable to the United Nations or NATO, as "KFOR was not
established as a [U.N.] force or organ, in contrast with other
154 Behrami, supra note 147, T 8.
155 Id. TT 9, 15 (explaining KFOR commander was a Norwegian officer at the time
of the arrest and was replaced by a French general in early October 2001).
156 Bodeau-Livinec, Buzzini & Villalpando, supra note 153, at 323.
157 Id. T 127.
158 Id. 132-43.
159 Behrami, supra note 147, 1121.
160 International Law Commission, Responsibility of international organizations:
Texts and titles of draft articles 1 to 67 adopted by the Drafting Committee on second
reading in 2011, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.778 (May 30, 2011) [hereinafter DARIO 2011].
The text of Article 4 in DARIO 2011 reads:
Elements of an internationally wrongful act of an international organization
There is an internationally wrongful act of an international organization when
conduct consisting of an action or omission:
(a) is attributable to that organization under international law; and
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that organization.
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peacekeeping forces and [with] UNMIK."61 To establish
individual state responsibility, the applicants noted that KFOR
troops, including the commanders, answered directly to their
national commanders; that the rules of engagement were national;
and that the troops were disciplined by national command.162
However, the court held that the Security Council, under
Resolution 1244, had "delegated" to willing organizations and
member states the power to establish KFOR.'16  Despite the
remote relationship between KFOR troops and United Nations
decision-makers, the United Nations retained "ultimate authority
and control" over the security of the mission, only delegating
operational command. 164 It was sufficient that the United Nations
had the authority to delegate such control, that it delegated it
within specific limits, and that it was kept abreast of events on the
ground by regular reports.165  Thus, no direct United Nations
influence over the impugned conduct was required to attribute
responsibility to the United Nations. 6 6 in such circumstances, the
court concluded, as the word was used in the Draft Articles,
"KFOR was exercising lawfully delegated Chapter VII powers of
the [Security Council] so that the impugned action was, in
principle, 'attributable' to the [United Nations]." 67
However, this arguably reflects a debatable interpretation of
the Draft Articles.168 According to Draft Article 6, the conduct of
161 Behrami, supra note 147, 1 77.
162 Id.
163 Id. 135.
164 Id. 140.
165 Id. 134.
166 Id. T 136. The ECtHR's delegation-attribution rationale derives from the work
of Professor Sarooshi, who argued that "the question of who exercizes operational
command and control over the force is immaterial to the question of responsibility. The
more important enquiry is who exercizes overall authority and control over the forces."
See DAN SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE
SECURITY 163 (1999) (original emphasis). He continues by stating that "acts of force
authorized by the Council are attributable to the [United Nations], since the forces are
acting under [U.N.] authority," and that the only two exceptions to this principle are
cases where the Council is "prevented from exercizing overall authority and control over
the force", or when the forces act "ultra vires." Id. at 165.
167 Behrami, supra note 147, 141.
168 Bodeau-Livinec, Buzzini & Villalpando, supra note 153, at 326.
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an organ or agent of an international organization in the
performance of functions of that organ or agent is attributable to
the organization.' In the ILC's view, "the general rule set out in
article [6]" also covers the situation in which a state organ is "fully
seconded to" an international organization.170  In contrast, Draft
Article 7 "deals with the situation in which the lent organ or agent
still acts to a certain extent as organ of the lending State or as
organ or agent of the lending organization." 7 ' Therefore, Draft
Article 7 would appear to be the basis for assessing whether any
act or omission by KFOR could be attributable to the United
Nations.
The criterion for attribution that has been raised in Draft
Article 7 is the "effective control" exercised by the international
organization over the conduct concerned.172 The effective control
test itself, a test for the attribution of conduct, has been affirmed
by a number of tribunals, including the ICJ in cases such as
Nicaragua"' and Bosnian Genocide.174  The commentary to the
169 DARIO 2011, supra note 160, art. 6. The text of Article 6 in DARIO 2011,
supra note 160 reads:
Conduct of organs or agents of an international organization
1. The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization in the
performance of functions of that organ or agent shall be considered an act of
that organization under international law, whatever position the organ or agent
holds in respect of the organization.
2. The rules of the organization apply in the determination of the functions of its
organs and agents.
170 International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission:
Fifty-sixth Session, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 10, A/59/10 at 110 (2004),
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/english/a 59_10.pdf [hereinafter 2004 ILC
Report].
171 Id. at 110. The text of Article 7 reads:
Conduct of organs of a State or organs or agents of an international organization
placed at the disposal of another international organization.
The conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international
organization that is placed at the disposal of another international organization
shall be considered under international law an act of the latter organization if
the organization exercises effective control over that conduct.
DARIO 2011, supra note 160, art. 7.
172 2004 ILC Report, supra note 170, at 113.
173 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf.
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Draft Articles indicates that this criterion should be understood as
"the factual control that is exercised over the specific conduct
taken by the organ or agent placed at the receiving organization's
disposal."' 75 In other words, "the decisive question in relation to
attribution of a given conduct appears to be who has effective
control over the conduct in question."' 76 Although the court relied
on the meaning of "effective control" in its decision, it did so with
respect to the broader issue of control exercised by international
security and civil presence over the territory of Kosovo"' -and "not
in order to characterize the control that would have been exercised
by the United Nations over the specific impugned conduct."'
On the issue of Saramati's detention, the court concluded that
the detention was attributable to the United Nations, given that the
"Security Council, 'in delegating its security powers,' exercised
the 'ultimate authority and control' over the conduct of KFOR."l 7 9
It is noteworthy that "the issue of 'effective control' over detention
matters appears only once in the Court's reasoning and not in
relation to the United Nations."' Indeed, the "Court referred to
the 'effectiveness (including the unity) of NATO's operational
command'-which, in its opinion, had been preserved since there
was no 'suggestion or evidence of any actual [troop-contributing
nations'] orders concerning, or interference in, the present
operational (detention) matter."'8 '
Regardless of whether the Security Council exercised
"ultimate authority and control" over KFOR operations, "such
authority and control would certainly not be the same as 'effective
control' over the conduct itself-that is, the detention of
Saramati."' 8 2 In this respect, the court itself drew the distinction
174 Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 47 (Feb. 26), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf.
175 2004 ILC Report, supra note 170, at 111.
176 Id. at 113.
177 Behrami, supra note 147, 70.
178 Bodeau-Livinec, Buzzini & Villalpando, supra note 153, at 327.
179 Behrami, supra note 147, 133.
180 Bodeau-Livinec, Buzzini & Villalpando, supra note 153, at 327.
I81 Id.
182 Id. at 328.
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between the "ultimate authority and control" that, in its opinion,
had been retained by the Security Council, and the "effective
command of the relevant operations" that had been retained by
NATO.183 This interpretation was rejected by the ILC, which
states in its revised commentary that the "European Court did not
apply the criterion of effective control in the way that had been
envisaged by the Commission."l8 4 In his Seventh Report, Special
Rapporteur Gaja concludes forcefully "had the Court applied the
criterion of effective control set out by the Commission, it would
have reached the different conclusion that the conduct of national
contingents allocated to KFOR had to be attributed either to the
sending State or to NATO." 8 5
It should be noted that consistent United Nations and state
practice over the last sixty years firmly distinguished between
United Nations-run operations (such as peacekeeping) and
authorizations to use force granted by the Security Council to
member states (such as KFOR).186 For example, in N.K. v.
Austria, the superior provincial court of Vienna decided that
Austria was not responsible for damage to the property of a
member of the Austrian contingent of the U.N. peacekeeping force
in the Golan Heights in 1975-76.'17 The plaintiff alleged that his
property had been damaged due to the negligence of another
Austrian soldier, and he claimed compensation from Austria.'
183 Id. at 325.
184 Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 61st Sess., May 4-June 5, July 6-Aug. 7, 2009,
U.N. Doc. A/64/10; GAOR, 64th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 67 (2009).
185 Special Rapporteur on Responsibility of International Organizations, Seventh
Rep. on Responsibility of International Organizations, Int'l Law Comm'n, T 26, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/610 (Mar. 27, 2009) (by Giorgio Gaja).
186 The U.N. Secretariat expressed this view forcefully before the ILC. Rep. of the
Int'l Law Comm'n, Responsibility of International Organizations, 63rd Sess., April 26-
June 3, July 4-Aug. 12, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/637/Add.1 (2011); see also FINN
SEYERSTED, UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN THE LAW OF PEACE AND WAR 110-12 (1966).
But see Nigel White & Sorcha MacLeod, EU Operations and Private Military
Contractors: Issues of Corporate and Institutional Responsibility, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L.
965, 974 (2008) (expressing their opinion that the positive legacy of Behrami was
precisely the overcoming of such a distinction between U.N.-run and U.N.-authorized
missions for the purposes of responsibility).
187 N.K. v. Austria, 77 I.L.R. 470 (Superior Provincial Court (Oberlandesgericht) of
Vienna 1979).
188 Id.
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Decided prior to the formulation of the Draft Articles, the action
was dismissed because the court considered that the soldier was
acting as an "organ" of the United Nations and not of Austria.18 9
With regard to the alleged failure to de-mine in the Behrami
case, the court noted that "UNMIK was a subsidiary organ of the
[United Nations] created under Chapter VII of the Charter so that
the impugned inaction was, in principle, 'attributable' to the
[United Nations] in the same sense."'90 This result would seem
uncontroversial, as Draft Article 6 assigns and the United Nations
itself assumes responsibility for the conduct of its organs during
operations.19 1 However, it is problematic that the court attributed
to UNMIK a failure to de-mine on the mere ground that "the
supervision of de-mining fell with UNMIK's mandate,"' 92 without
examining the nature, content, and extent of the obligation to de-
mine or the conditions and modalities for its implementation. 93
Such an examination should have been conducted to assess
whether the alleged failure to de-mine was attributable to the
United Nations; to the respondent states in their capacity as troop-
contributing nations to KFOR; or to NATO, as the holder of the
operative command of KFOR.194
Having attributed the actions of KFOR and UNMIK to the
United Nations, the court noted that the United Nations had a legal
personality separate from that of member states and that the
organization is not a party to the ECHR.195 In light of the court's
189 Similarly, the House of Lords decided that the U.K. government was liable for
damages caused to a British national by British troops, notwithstanding the fact that the
troops were serving with the U.N. Attorney-General v. Nissan, [1970] A.C. 508 (H.L)
[242].
190 Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, App. Nos. 71412/01, 78166/01, 45 Eur.
H.R. Rep. SE10 T 143 (2007).
191 Larsen, supra note 148, at 520. Note, however, that the United Nations in its
observations to the court concluded that the actions in the cases could not be attributed to
UNMIK. See Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, App. Nos. 71412/01, 78166/01, 45
Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 120 (2007). This is a different issue, as it concerns the relationship
between KFOR and UNMIK, not between the states and the United Nations. Id.
192 Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, App. Nos. 71412/01, 78166/01, 45 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 1 127 (2007).
193 Milanovid & Papi6, supra note 148, at 274.
194 Bodeau-Livinec, Buzzini & Villalpando, supra note 153, at 328.
195 Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, App. Nos. 71412/01, 78166/01, 45 Eur.
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previous case law, the question remained, however, whether the
court was competent ratione personae to review the act of the
respondent states carried out on behalf of the United Nations. In
this regard, the court considered that:
the Convention cannot be interpreted in a manner which would
subject the acts and omissions of Contracting Parties which are
covered by [Security Council] Resolutions and occur prior to or
in the course of [operations under Chapter VII of the Charter], to
the scrutiny of the Court. To do so would be to interfere with
the fulfilment of the [United Nations'] key mission in this field
including ... with the effective conduct of its operations. It
would also be tantamount to imposing conditions on the
implementation of a [Security Council] Resolution which were
not provided for in the text of the Resolution itself.196
The court further noted that "the impugned acts and omissions
of KFOR and UNMIK cannot be attributed to the respondent
States and, moreover, did not take place on the territory of those
States or by virtue of a decision of their authorities."' 97 In doing
so, the court did not address the possibility that an action or
omission may be attributable to two or more entities (in this
instant case, to the United Nations and also to the respondent
state[s] or NATO). Again, it is uncertain whether the court's
approach on this issue is consistent with the Draft Articles. 9 8 In
its introductory commentary to the set of draft articles dealing with
the attribution of conduct to an international organization, the ILC
states:
Although it may not frequently occur in practice, dual or even
multiple attribution of conduct cannot be excluded. Thus,
attribution of a certain conduct to an international organization
does not imply that the same conduct cannot be attributed to a
State, nor does vice versa attribution of conduct to a State rule
out attribution of the same conduct to an international
organization.' 99
H.R. Rep. 144 (2007).
196 Id. 1 49.
197 Id. 151.
198 Bodeau-Livinec, Buzzini & Villalpando, supra note 153, at 329; Larsen, supra
note 148, at 524.
199 2004 ILC Report, supra note 170, at 101; see Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n,
2014 291
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Notwithstanding the potential drawbacks of such a judicial
approach, the court's reasoning in the Behrami and Saramati cases
was adopted in a number of other judicial decisions. In Kasumaj
v. Greece and Gajic v. Germany, dealing with issues of property
occupied or used by contingents of KFOR in Kosovo, the ECtHR
declared the applications inadmissible on the mere grounds that
"KFOR actions were in principle attributable to the [United
Nations]."2 00 In Berid v. Bosnia and Herzegovinia, the ECtHR
extended this reasoning "to the acceptance of an international civil
administration in its territory by a respondent State" and
considered that the impugned action by the High Representative
for Bosnia and Herzegovina "was, in principle, 'attributable' to the
[United Nations]."201
The ECtHR revisited these issues in Al-Jedda v. United
Kingdom,20 2 an appeal from the U.K. House of Lords.203 The
applicant in Al-Jedda was an Iraqi/British national2 04 detained by
the British military in a British-run detention center in Basra, Iraq,
between October 2004 and December 2007.205 He was believed to
have been involved in recruiting and working with terrorists,
although no criminal charges were filed against Al-Jedda during
his detention or thereafter.2 0 6 Al-Jedda, however, filed a petition
58th Sess., May I-June 9, July 3-Aug 11, 2009, U.N. Doc. A/61/10; GAOR, 61st Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, at 277-78 (2006).
200 Kasumaj v. Greece, App. No. 6974/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007); Gajic v. Germany,
App. No. 31446/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007).
201 Berid v. Bosnia & and Herzegovina, App. No. 36357/04, 36360/04, 38346/04,
41705/04, 45190/04, 45578/04, 45579/04, 45580/04, 91/05, 97/05, 100/05, 101/05,
1121/05, 1123/05, 1125/05, 1129/05, 1132/05, 1133/05, 1169/05, 1172/05, 1175/05,
1177/05, 1180/05, 1185/05, 20793/05 and 25496/05, Eur. Ct. H.R, if 21, 30 (2007),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-83109.
202 AI-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-105612.
203 R (In re AI-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 58, [2008] 1
A.C. (H.L) [332] (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-105612/jedda.pdf.
204 Al-Jedda was later stripped of his British citizenship. Al-Jedda, App. No.
27021/08 19.
205 Al-Jedda, App. No. 27021/08 10-11.
206 A Special Immigration Appeals Commission held in a closed judgment that the
Secretary of State had proved "on the balance of probabilities" that Al-Jedda had
terrorist connections. Al-Jedda, App. No. 27021/08 1 15. AI-Jedda did not appeal this
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in the United Kingdom in 2005 challenging his detention under the
Human Rights Act, the domestic legislation implementing the
ECHR.20 7 In contrast, the U.K. argued that, pursuant to Article
103 of the Charter,20 8 Article 5 of the ECHR was preempted by
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, which
established the interim government in Iraq and conferred the
multinational force with the "authority to 'take all necessary
measures' to contribute to the maintenance of security and
stability in Iraq." 209 in short, because British forces had detained
Al-Jedda while acting as part of the Coalition Provisional
Authority, the United Kingdom's position was that his detention
was attributable to the United Nations under Resolution 1546.210
On the issue of attribution, the court distinguished Al-Jedda's
application from the decisions in Behrami and Saramati, noting
the role of the United Nations in relation to the security in Iraq in
2004 was vastly different to the role it had played in Kosovo in
1999.211 The court emphasized that the international security
presence in Kosovo was established by Security Council
Resolution 1244, whereas the United Kingdom had entered Iraq
with coalition forces without such a resolution.2 12 The adoption of
Security Council Resolutions 1511 and 1546 had not altered the
unified command structure of the Multi-National Force, which had
remained substantially the same since the invasion in March 2003,
nor did the Court "consider that, as a result of the authorization
contained in Resolution 1511, the acts of soldiers within the Multi-
National Force became attributable to the United Nations or-
judgment. Id.
207 In response, the Secretary of State for Defence acknowledged that Al-Jedda was
within U.K. jurisdiction during his detention, which implicated his rights under the
ECHR. Id. 16.
208 See U.N. Charter art. 103, which reads:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall
prevail.
209 S. C. Res. 1546, T 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004).
210 Al-Jedda,App.No.27021/08 66.
211 Id. T 83.
212 Id.
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more importantly, for the purposes of this case-ceased to be
attributable to the troop-contributing nations."2 13
This is an important development, as the court essentially
admitted the possibility of dual or multiple attribution of the same
conduct to the United Nations and to a state, a possibility that it
did not entertain in Behrami.214 The court then continued:
It would appear from the opinion of Lord Bingham in the first
set of proceedings brought by the applicant that it was common
ground between the parties before the House of Lords that the
test to be applied in order to establish attribution was that set out
by the International Law Commission, in Article [7] of its draft
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations and
in its commentary thereon, namely that the conduct of an organ
of a State placed at the disposal of an international organisation
should be attributable under international law to that
organisation if the organisation exercises effective control over
that conduct (see paragraphs 18 and 56 above). For the reasons
set out above, the Court considers that the United Nations
Security Council had neither effective control nor ultimate
authority and control over the acts and omissions of troops
within the Multi-National Force and that the applicant's
detention was not, therefore, attributable to the United
215Nations.
Here, the court does not acknowledge in any way the
overwhelming criticism that Behrami has received, but is content
to declare that the situation in Iraq satisfies neither the ILC's test
nor its own, without clarifying which applies and why.216 While it
was fairly predictable that the court would distinguish Behrami
rather than apply it or overrule it, the court's evasiveness is still
quite troubling.2 17
On the merits, regarding the apparent conflict between the
Article 5 of the ECHR and Resolution 1546 and the role of Article
103 of the Charter, the court noted:
213 Id. 180.
214 Marko Milanovid, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, 23 EUR. J. INT'L L.
121, 136 (2012), http://ejil.oxfordjoumals.org/content/23/1/12 .full.pdf.
215 Al-Jedda, App. No. 27021/08, T 84.
216 Milanovid, supra note 214, at 137.
217 Id.
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In interpreting its resolutions, there must be a presumption that
the Security Council does not intend to impose any obligations
on Member States to breach fundamental principles of human
rights. In the event of any ambiguity in the terms of the Security
Council Resolution, the Court must therefore choose the
interpretation which is most in harmony with the requirements
of the Convention and which avoids any conflict of obligations.
In the light of the United Nations' important role in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights, it is to be expected
that clear and explicit language would be used were the Security
Council to intend States to take particular measures which
would conflict with their obligations under international human
rights law.218
Sir Nigel Rodley similarly argued for a strong interpretative
presumption in his separate opinion in the Sayadi case before the
Human Rights Committee.219 Despite the fact that a letter by the
U.S. Secretary of State annexed to the resolution expressly
referred to security internment,22 0 the court still did not find that
the presumption was rebutted. 2 21 This is because the resolution
seemed to leave internment as just one of a number of options that
the states concerned could use, since it also expressly referred to
218 Al-Jedda, App. No. 27021/08 1 102.
219 Human Rights Comm., Rep. on its 94th Sess., Oct. 13-31, 2008, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (Oct. 22, 2008), http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/1472-
2006.pdf; see also Marko Milanovid, Norm Conflict in International Law: Whither
Human Rights?, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 69, 97-102 (2009) (making a similar
argument, relying on domestic public law jurisprudence).
220 Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council decided "that the
multinational force shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute
to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed
to this resolution expressing, inter alia, the Iraqi request for the continued presence of the
multinational force and setting out its tasks, including by preventing and deterring
terrorism." Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Endorses Formation of
Sovereign Interim Government in Iraq; Welcomes End of Occupation by 30 June,
Democratic Elections by January 2005, U.N. Press Release SC/8117 (Aug. 6, 2004).
The letters referred to were sent to the Council by the then-U.S. Secretary of State, Colin
Powell, and the interim prime minister of Iraq, Ayad Allawi. Id. Colin Powell's letter
outlined the duties of the MNF forces, stating that these "will include combat operations
against members of [insurgent] groups, internment where this is necessary for imperative
reasons of security, and the continued search for and securing of weapons that threaten
Iraq's security." Id.
221 Al-Jedda, App. No. 27021/08 1 105-06.
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the need to comply with international human rights law, and since
the U.N. Secretary-General and his special representative in Iraq
frequently objected to the use of internment.2 22 "By the Court's
standard, it would seem that unless the Security Council itself
explicitly worded a resolution to authorize practices prohibited by
the ECHR, the Court would not recognize an Article 103 conflict
and could find liability for breach of ECHR obligations."223
The Dutch Court of Appeal took a different approach in a
decision rendered two days before the decision in the Al-Jedda
case. 24 In Nuhanovid v. The Netherlands and Mustafid-Mujid et al
v. The Netherlands, the court held the State of the Netherlands had
acted unlawfully and was liable under Dutch law for evicting four
Bosniaks from the Dutchbat-controlled compound (a Dutch
battalion under the command of the U.N. peacekeeping force,
UNPROFOR) in Srebrenica.2 25 Although Bosnian Serbs
subsequently killed Ibro Nuhanovid, Muhamed Nuhanovi6, Nasiha
Nuhanovid, and Rizo Mustafi6, the court only ruled on the actual
removal of them from the compound, not on any failure of the
Netherlands to subsequently protect them. 2 6 The claim that the
Netherlands (and the United Nations) had failed to offer protection
to Bosniak men has been made in a parallel, but otherwise
unrelated, case brought on behalf of the Mothers of Srebrenica
discussed later in this Article.227
222 Id.
223 Alka Pradhan, Introductory Note, European Court of Human Rights: Al-Jedda
v. United Kingdom & Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, 50 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 947, 948 (2011).
224 Hof, Hague, July 5, 2011, 200.020.173/01 (Mustafid-Mujid/Netherlands)
(Neth.), http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2011:BR
5386; Hof , Hague, July 5, 2011, 200.020.174/01 (Nuhanovid/Netherlands) (Neth.),
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2011:BR5388.
225 The Dutch government has indicated that it will appeal the decisions to the
Dutch Supreme Court, although prospect of reversal is limited because the Supreme
Court cannot review findings of fact or interpretations of foreign law. See, e.g.,
Nuhanovic and Mustafic v. The Netherlands, ASSER INSTITUTE, http://www.asser.nl/
default.aspx?site id=36&levelIl=15248&level2=&level3=&textid=39985 (last visited
Sept. 13, 2013). Moreover, the AI-Jedda decision makes reversal on the international
law issue of attribution significantly less likely than might have been the case when
Behrami and Saramati was the principal international precedent.
226 Nuhanovi6, 200.020.174/01, 1 3.1
227 See infra Sec. V.
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Regarding attribution, the Dutch Court of Appeal determined
that the proper standard of attribution is "effective control."22 8 In
doing so, it rejected the standard of attribution of conduct that was
used by the district court ("operational overall control"), the
standard used by the ECtHR in Behrami and Saramati ("ultimate
authority and control"), and the position taken by the United
Nations that peacekeeping troops are to be considered a subsidiary
organ of the United Nations.22 9 Unlike the ECtHR in Al-Jedda, the
Dutch Court of Appeal categorically aligned itself with the
criterion formulated by Article 7 of the Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of International Organizations.230 Under this test,
the Netherlands would not owe the men a tort law duty if it did not
exercise effective control over its troops. This would be the case
if, for example, it had lost the legal authority and factual ability to
instruct and supervise its troops, because this authority and ability
was entirely with the United Nations.
The Dutch Court of Appeal also anticipated Al-Jedda in
accepting the possibility of dual attribution.23 1 Specifically:
[T]he Court adopts as a starting point that the possibility that
more than one party has "effective control" is generally
accepted, which means that it cannot be ruled out that the
application of this criterion results in the possibility of
attribution to more than one party. For this reason the Court will
only examine if the State exercised "effective control" over the
alleged conduct and will not answer the question whether the
[United Nations] also had "effective control."232
For effective control by the State to exist, the court found it
relevant that the State kept control over the personal affairs of the
troops and possessed formal power to take disciplinary
measures. 2 33 The court also considered that the fall of Srebrenica
brought the peacekeeping operation to an end and that from July
228 Nuhanovi, 200.020.174/01, 1 5.7.
229 Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, Responsibility of International Organizations.
Comments and Observations Received from International Organizations, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/637/Add.1, Feb. 17, 2011, 10.
230 Nuhanovid, 200.020.174101, 5.8.
231 Id. T 5.9.
232 Id.
233 Id.1 5.10.
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11, 1995, onwards the Dutchbat's only aim was to evacuate the
refugees in a way that ensured their safety.234 Thus, the court
distinguished this situation from a normal peacekeeping
operation.2 35 Moreover, the court noted that during the transition
period, the Dutch government was actively involved in the
Dutchbat operation. 236 The control over the Dutchbat was not only
theoretical, it was exercised in practice-the Dutch government,
represented by its two highest-ranking officers, had taken the
decision to evacuate the Dutchbat and the refugees, and the
Minister of Defense had ordered the Dutchbat not to cooperate in
the separation of male Muslim refugees in Srebrenica.23 7
The court concluded that the Dutchbat's conduct was directly
linked to the decisions and instructions of the Dutch
government. 23 8 The Dutchbat's refusal to put the men on the list
of local personnel and telling them to leave the compound was
directly linked to the way the Dutchbat's evacuation was to be
executed, namely by following the instructions as to who was
going to be included in the evacuation operation. 239 According to
the court, this implied that the alleged wrongful conduct was
within the State's effective control and could therefore be
attributed to the Netherlands.24 0 In a sense, then, the Dutch Court
of Appeal in Nuhanovid and Mustafid-Mujid and the ECtHR in Al-
Jedda approached Behrami from different sides: in Nuhanovid and
Mustafi-Mujid the U.N. mission was already over, which meant
that the effective control of the sending State was revived; in Al-
Jedda, the mission had begun before the involvement of the
United Nations, which meant that the United Nations had not
acquired effective control.2 4 1
234 Id 5.11.
235 The Court of Appeal distinguished Behrami and it should be noted that the
Court of Appeal did not consider the question of whether dual attribution is possible in
normal peacekeeping situations. Id. 5.11.
236 Nuhanovi6, 200.020.174/01 TT 5.12-17.
237 Id. T5.18.
238 Id. 5.19.
239 Id. T 5.17.
240 Id. T 5.19-5.20.
241 Tobias Thienel, Issues of attribution in Al-Jedda and Srebrenica: The Cases
Compared, WEBLOG OF THE NETHERLANDS SCHOOL OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Aug. 28, 2011),
298 Vol. XXXIX
UNITED NATIONS TORT LIABILITY
More broadly, the court took the position that, in order to
determine whether the state had effective control over an act, it is
not only relevant whether that act was an implementation of a
specific instruction by either the United Nations or the State but
also whether, "if there was no such specific instruction, the
[United Nations] or the State had the power to prevent the conduct
concerned." 24 2  Thus, the removal of the Bosniaks from the
compound could be attributable to the Netherlands, if the
Netherlands was able to prevent that removal. The approach taken
by the Dutch Court of Appeal is quite close to a position defended
by Tom Dannenbaum in a recent piece on attribution in
peacekeeping operations.24 3 Dannenbaum argues, "[E]ffective
control ... is held by the entity that is best positioned to act
effectively and within the law to prevent the abuse in question.' 244
His interpretation aims at "ensuring that the actor held responsible
is the actor most capable of preventing the human rights abuse."2 45
However, it seems overly broad to declare that a state
exercises effective control in regard to a particular act if it is able
to prevent that act.246  There is always the possibility for troop-
contributing states to send orders or instructions to its nationals
who serve in a U.N. operation, allowing it to exercise control in a
way that prevents the impugned conduct from occurring.24 7
Therefore, if one accepts "power to prevent" as the relevant
standard, the conduct of peacekeeping forces, by definition, can
http://invisiblecollege.weblog.leidenuniv.nl/2011/08/28/issues-of-attribution-in-aI-jedda-
and-sr.
242 Nuhanovik,200.020.174/01, 5.9.
243 Dannenbaum, supra note 55, at 126. This piece was relied on by the counsel for
the plaintiffs and is cited by the Court (though on another point). Nuhanovid,
200.020.174/01, 5.8.
244 Dannenbaum, supra note 55, at 157.
245 Id. at 158.
246 Andr6 Nollkaemper, Dual Attribution: Liability of the Netherlands for Conduct
ofDutchbat in Srebrenica, 9 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1143, 1148 (2011).
247 Indeed, it is on this basis some scholars have taken the position that the conduct
of peacekeeping troops can always be attributed to both the sending state and the U.N.
See Luigi Condorelli, Le statut des forces de l'ONU et le droit international humanitaire,
78 RIVISTA DI DIRITrO INTERNAZIONALE 881 (1995) (It.); Luigi Condorelli, Le statut des
forces des Nations Unies et le droit international humanitaire, in LES CASQUES BLEUS:
POLICIERS OU COMBATTANTS? 87 (Claude Emmanuelli ed., 1997) (It.).
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always be attributed to the state (whether or not in parallel to the
United Nations). There is little practice to support this broad
construction, and the comments by States and international
organizations to the Draft Articles do not offer much support for
this interpretation.24 8 As member states have not implemented a
standing U.N. army, U.N. peace operations are reliant on ad hoc
coalitions of troop-contributing countries.24 9 Such an all-
encompassing definition of "effective control" may have the
unintended consequence of chilling the willingness of states to
participate in U.N. operations.
V. Limiting Immunity Based on the Right of Access to Court
In the alternative, when the tortious behavior cannot be
attributed to troop-contributing countries, plaintiffs have sought to
have the United Nations' immunity overridden. In Mothers of
Srebrenica v. the Netherlands and United Nations,250 the
Association of Citizens Mothers of Srebrenica (the "Association")
argued that the United Nations and the Netherlands, by failing to
protect thousands of male civilians trapped in the Srebrenica
enclave, were liable for the 1995 genocide.2 5 1 Specifically, the
Association alleged that each had failed to prevent the genocide,
thus acting contrary to promises and other legal obligations
previously made, "and therefore [each were] negligent."2 52 The
judgment was made in connection with interlocutory claims
brought by the Netherlands arguing that the court had no
jurisdiction with regard to the United Nations and that the
Netherlands be allowed to intervene or join the case against the
United Nations.25 3 Without going into any detail on the procedural
discussions taken up by the court, the Appeal Court in The Hague
allowed the Netherlands to join the United Nations as a party in
248 Nollkaemper, supra note 246, at 1148.
249 See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 148, at 520.
250 Hof, Hague, Mar. 30, 2010, 200.20.151/01 (Mothers of Srebrenica/Netherlands
& United Nations) (Neth.), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/Netherlands/
Mothers-of Srebrenica JudgmentCourt of Appeal_30-03-2010.pdf.
251 Id. T1.1.
252 Id. 5.10.
253 Id. 2.3, 2.4.
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the action and upheld the district court's ruling.254 This allowed
the state to discharge its duty vis-a-vis the ICJ's decision in
Cumarawamy "to inform its courts of the position taken by the
Security-General" concerning the immunity of the United
Nations.255
The court recognized that absolute immunity provided to the
United Nations under the Convention as well as under Article 105
of the Charter.256  However, the Association argued that this
immunity should be "surpassed" on the basis of their right to
access a court of law,257 as embodied in Article 6 of the ECHR2 58
and Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR").2 59  The Dutch Court of Appeal held that the
United Nations' immunity could be set aside as conflicting with
the prohibition on the denial of justice, although it was not
justified in this case. In contrast, the Dutch Supreme Court took
the position that neither the right of access to courts under Article
6 of the ECHR and Article 14 of the ICCPR nor jus cogens
prohibition against genocide under the Genocide Convention
overrode immunity.2 60
According to the Dutch Court of Appeal, the duty of the
Netherlands to provide access to a court was not displaced by
254 Id. T 6.
255 Benjamin E. Brockman-Hawe, Questioning the UN's Immunity in the Dutch
Courts: Unresolved Issues in the Mothers of Srebrenica Litigation, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUD. L. REV. 727, 732 (2011). See also Guido den Dekker & Jessica Schechinger, The
Immunity of the United Nations before the Dutch courts Revisited, THE HAGUE JUSTICE
PORTAL,
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Commentaries%20PDF/HJJ_Immunity of UN
EN.pdf (discussing U.N. immunity).
256 Mothers of Srebrenica, 200.20.151/0 1 1 4.2.
257 Id.T 5.1.
258 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/Convention ENG.pdf.
259 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/
Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/volume-999-I-14668-English.pdf.
260 HR, Apr. 13, 2012, Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands & United Nations,
10/04437, available at http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:
HR:2012:BW1999&keyword=10%2f04437.
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Article 103 of the Charter, which provides that, in the event of a
conflict between the obligations of the members of the United
Nations under the Charter and their obligations under another
international agreement, their Charter obligations prevail.261
Instead, the court concluded that Article 103 of the Charter was
not intended to allow the Charter to "just set aside" fundamental
rights recognized by customary international law or international
262conventions. Referring to the provisions in the Charter
concerning the promotion and encouragement of human and
fundamental rights, the court found it "implausible" that Article
103 was intended to impair the enforcement of such rights.2 63
Thus, the court held that it was not precluded from testing
United Nations' immunity against ECHR and ICCPR
provisions.26 4 Simply asserting away the conflict rule brings to
mind Koskenniemi's critique of the European Union's approach to
intemational law as "[s]olispsistic in the sense of capable of seeing
nothing else than one's own legal system . .. [and] imperialistic
because everything taking place in the world is judged from its
perspective. Or, I should like to say, everything as long as this is
convenient. 265 While Article 103 was not drafted for the purpose
of freezing human rights at 1945 levels, it was intended to pre-
empt the displacement of the terms of the Charter by subsequent
treaties, even human rights treaties.2 66 This would seem to be
exactly the circumstances before the Dutch Court of Appeal in
Mothers of Srebrenica. The absence of direct and meaningful
engagement with this issue seriously undermines the court's
261
reasoning.
261 Mothers of Srebrenica, 200.20.151/01, 1 5.5.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Martti Koskenniemi, International Law: Constitutionalism, Managerialism and
the Ethos ofLegal Education, I EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2007). Similarly, the Court of
Justice of the European Union has held that "the constitutional framework created by the
EC Treaty as a wholly autonomous legal order, [is] not subject to the higher rules of
international law-in this case the law deriving from the Charter of the United Nations."
Kadi v. Commission [2010] E.C.R 11-05177, 1 119.
266 See Brockman-Hawe, supra note 255, at 739.
267 Id
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It should be noted, the Dutch court never made an affirmative
finding that the ECHR applied, but instead merely assumed that
the case fell within the ratione materiae of the ECHR. 268 As the
ECHR obliges States to extend protections to individuals "within
their jurisdiction," U.N. immunity arguably renders the ECHR
inapplicably by removing U.N. action from the scope of national
jurisdiction. The English courts have followed the "no-conflict"
approach of denying the relevance of Article 6 to international
immunities. In Jones v. Ministry of Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-
Arabiya AS Saudiya (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), Lord
Bingham of the House of Lords questioned the applicability of
Article 6 of the ECHR to claims brought against a foreign state for
torture and expressed confusion with respect to the notion that "a
state can be said to deny access to its court if it has no access to
,,161give. Justice Tomlinson followed this reasoning with respect
to the immunity of international organizations, denying the
necessity of considering the relationship between UNESCO's
immunity and Article 6 because the U.K. "possessed no
jurisdiction over UNESCO unless UNESCO chose to waive its
immunity."2 70 It is unfortunate that the Dutch court did not engage
in a meaningful, judicial dialogue and address this jurisdictional
concern. 2 7 1
The Dutch Court of Appeal noted that the European Court of
Human Rights has ruled that the immunity of international
organizations must be "set aside" under certain circumstances in
deference to the right of access to a court of law recognized by the
ECHR. 272  However, the ECtHR also stressed that the right of
268 See id. at 740; see also Mothers of Srebrenica, 200.20.151/01, 1 5.2-5.5.
269 Jones v. Ministry of Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya AS Saudiya (the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia), [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 AC 270, 1 14 (appeal taken from Eng.).
270 Entico Corporation Limited v. Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs and UNESCO, [2008] EWHC 531 (Comm), [2008] 2 All ER
(Comm) 97 [23] (Eng.), reprinted in 2008 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 477, U.N. DOC.
ST/LEG/SER.C/46.
271 MATTHIAS KLOTH, IMMUNITIES AND THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COURT UNDER
ARTICLE 6 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 28-30 (2010) (suggesting
that the approach of the English Courts is flawed because national courts have
jurisdiction until it is affirmatively removed by the grant of immunity).
272 See Mothers of Srebrenica, 200.20.151/01, 5.2.
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access to a court of law was not absolute and may be subject to
restrictions, provided that those restrictions do not violate the
"essence" of that right. 273 The Dutch Court of Appeal applied the
criteria developed by Beer and Reagan v. Germany and Waite and
Kennedy, according to which a restriction to access is permissible
if it serves a legitimate goal, if it is proportionate, and if an
interested party has access to reasonable alternative means to
protect its rights under the ECHR.274
The legitimacy requirement was disposed of quickly by
concluding that immunity had been granted for the purposes of
promoting the effective operation of the United Nations. 275 The
proportionality of the grant was assessed in light of the "special
position" of the United Nations as the only international
organization authorized to use force to preserve international
peace. According to the court:
[i]n connection with these extensive powers, which may involve
the [United Nations] and the troops made available to them in
conflict situations more often than not entailing conflicting
interests of several parties, there is a real risk that if the [United
Nations] did not enjoy, or only partially enjoyed immunity from
prosecution, the [United Nations] would be exposed to claims by
parties to the conflict and summoned before national courts of
law of the country in which the conflict takes place. In view of
the sensitivity of the conflict in which the [United Nations] may
be involved this might include situations in which the [United
Nations] is summoned for the sole reason of obstructing any
action undertaken by the Security Council, or even preventing it
altogether. It is not inconceivable, either, that the [United
Nations] is summoned in countries where the judiciary is not up
to the requirements set by the ECHR. The immunity from
prosecution granted to the [United Nations] therefore is closely
connected to the public interest pertaining to keeping the peace
and safety in the world.276
273 Id.
274 See id. (citing Beer and Regan v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 28934/95
(Feb. 18, 1999) and Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, 1991-I Eur. Ct. H.R.).
275 See id 5.2.
276 Id. 15.7; see also Brower, supra note 10, at 92 (writing that "national prejudices
still threaten the work of international organizations. These prejudices justify the
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Neither the plaintiffs' allegations that the United Nations had
failed to do enough to prevent the Srebrenica genocide nor the fact
that the United Nations had failed to establish an alternative forum
where the claimants could have their case against the United
Nations heard, were sufficiently "compelling" to justify a finding
that the grant of immunity was disproportionate to its objectives.2 7
With respect to the first of these claims, the Dutch Court of
Appeal observed that the United Nations had neither committed
nor assisted in the commission of the Srebrenica genocide.278
Moreover, although the accusation that the United Nations had
failed to prevent the genocide was "serious," setting aside
immunity on the grounds suggested by the applicants might "be
latched onto too easily [by other courts], which could lead to
misuse."279
Finally, with regard to the plaintiffs' claim that there was no
procedure that sufficiently safeguarded access to a court of law,
the court expressed "regret" that the United Nations had not
instigated alternative proceedings in conformity with its
280obligations under the Convention. In particular, the court
stressed that Section 29(a) of the Convention requires the United
Nations to provide appropriate dispute settlement procedures in
private law claims against the United Nations.281' This particular
part of the decision is problematic for a number of reasons. First,
the court assumed that the claim was one of a private law character
when it is not clear whether the claim is based on a domestic "tort"
obligation/violation, on a public international law obligation to
prevent genocide,28 2 or on a combination of both.283
continued existence of international immunities and the maintenance of decision-making
authority at the international level.").
277 See Mothers of Srebrenica, 200.20.151/01, 5.7; see also Cumaraswamy, supra
note 19, 61 (showing the ICJ indicated that States could disagree for the "most
compelling reasons with the Secretary-General's determination to not waive immunity").
278 See Mothers of Srebrenica, 200.20.151/01, 5.10.
279 Id.
280 See id 5.13.
281 See id T 5.8, 5.11. 5.13.
282 The plaintiffs alleged the U.N. acted contrary to Article 1 of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. See id. 1.11.
283 Johnson, supra note 44, at 1014.
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Second, the court "did not seem to have been informed (nor
did it apparently inquire) [about] how the [United Nations had]
applied and interpreted that provision since 1946."284 The court
briefly referred to the SOFA between the United Nations and the
host country concerning the U.N. protection force
("UNPROFOR"), having noted simply that the state "has
insufficiently refuted" the argument of the Association that that
agreement did not offer a realistic opportunity to sue the United
Nations.2 85 However, there is no discussion of what the agreement
actually provided or why it did not offer a realistic opportunity for
pursuing a case against the United Nations. Oddly, the court did
not discuss the SOFA's authorization of the creation of a claim
commission, any relevant reports of the Secretary-General, or
common practice.2 86 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the
purported failure of the United Nations to comply with the
Convention did not decisively impair the right of access to a court
because alternative forums existed where the appellants could hold
responsible "two categories of parties liable for the damages
incurred by the mothers of Srebrenica, namely the perpetrators of
the genocide and the State."28 7 The conclusion with respect to
claims against the Netherlands seems to ignore the holdings in
Behrami and Saramati, which stated that only the United Nations
and not the troop-contributing nations are liable for peacekeeping
missions.28 8 This would appear to have been equally applicable in
this case, as the Dutch Court of Appeal decided Mothers of
Srebrenica before Nuhanovic.
Analogous arguments have been made in the United States,
that granting immunity to the United Nations would result in
multiple violations of the U.S. Constitution, including violations
284 Id
285 See Mothers of Srebrenica, 200.20.151/01, 5.11.
286 See supra Section II.
287 See Mothers of Srebrenica, 200.20.151/01, 1 5.13; see also Dekker &
Schechinger, supra note 255, at 7-8 ("[W]ith respect to the responsible political and
military leaders of the Bosnian-Serb army, which the Court of Appeal apparently has in
mind,... [t]his argument seems a bit far-fetched, because... a civil claim against an
individual soldier of the Bosnian-Serb Army ... would (in principle) be passed on to the
State of Bosnia-Herzegovina.").
288 See supra notes 147-161 and accompanying text.
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of procedural and substantive due process rights, as well as one's
rights under the First and Seventh Amendments.28 9 In Urban v.
United Nations the U.S. Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia Circuit held that a "court must take great care not to
'unduly impair[] [a litigant's] constitutional right of access to
courts."'2 9 0 However, in that particular case, the court did not need
to assess the issue of immunity from suit, since it found the case
was launched by a "frivolous litigant flooding the court with
meritless, fanciful claims."29 1 The plaintiffs in Brzak made similar
contentions, but, in contrast to Dutch Court of Appeal in Mothers
of Srebrenica, the U.S. court conclusively rejected these
constitutional challenges to the existence of immunities, declaring
that:
[L]egislatively and judicially crafted immunities of one sort or
another have existed since well before the framing of the
Constitution, have been extended and modified over time, and
are firmly embedded in American law. If appellants'
constitutional argument were correct, judicial immunity,
prosecutorial immunity, and legislative immunity, for example,
could not exist. Suffice it to say, they offer no principled
arguments as to why the continuing existence of immunities
violates the Constitution.292
Mothers of Srebrenica was appealed to the Dutch Supreme
Court, which held that the Dutch Court of Appeal erred in relying
on the criteria in Waite and Kennedy in order to evaluate whether
U.N. immunity should be set aside for the right to a fair trial.2 93 In
Waite and Kennedy, the ECtHR did not consider the relation
between Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 103 of the U.N.
Charter.29 4 Therefore, the Supreme Court held that there was no
reason to assume that the ECtHR meant to include the United
Nations when it found that the availability of "reasonable
289 See Greta L. Rios & Edward P. Flaherty, International Organization Reform or
Impunity? Immunity is the Problem, 16 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 433, 440-44,449-50.
290 Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (alterations in
original).
291 Id.
292 Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F. 3d 107, 114 (2d. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
293 See Mothers of Srebrenica, 200.20.151/01, 4.3.5.
294 See id.
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alternative means to protect effectively their rights under the
Convention" was "a material factor" in determining whether the
grant of immunity to an international organization was permissible
under the ECHR, at least not as far as the acts of the United
Nations under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter were concerned.29 5
Instead, the court, relying on Behrami and Saramati, determined
that under Article 103, U.N. immunity took precedence over
.conflicting obligations under other international agreements. 2 96
In order to sidestep the Article 103 issue, the plaintiffs argued
that this rule does not extend to cases where a violation ofjus
cogens, a peremptory norm of general international law, is
alleged.29 7 Unlike ordinary customary law, which has traditionally
required consent and allows the alteration of its obligations
between states through treaties, jus cogens cannot be violated by
any state "through international treaties or local or special customs
or even general customary rules not endowed with the same
normative force." 2 98  To refute the plaintiffs proposition, the
Dutch Supreme Court cited the ECtHR case of Al-Adsani v. UK29 9
and the recent ICJ ruling in Germany v. Italy (Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State).3 00 Both courts found that there was
currently no rule of customary international law that prevented
states from claiming immunity in cases dealing with violations of
jus cogens.301 The ECtHR in Al-Adsani v. UK held that:
295 See id. 4.3.2.
296 See id. T 4.3.4-6.
297 See id T4.3.7.
298 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundfija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment, T 153 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
299 See Mothers ofSrebrenica, 200.20.151/01, 14.3.7-.3.8.
300 See id 4.3.10-.3.13.
301 In addition, this argument about the effect of jus cogens displacing the law of
state immunity has been rejected by the following national courts: United Kingdom
(Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26; [2007] 1 AC 270, (H.L) (appeal taken from
Eng.); Canada (Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 675,143,
D.L.R.4th 243 (Can. Ont. C.A.)); Poland (Natoniewski v. Germany, Polish Yearbook of
International Law 2010, 299); Slovenia (Case No. Up-13/99, Constitutional Court of
Slovenia); New Zealand (Fang v. Jiang, [2007] NZAR 420 (H.C.)); 141 I.L.R.702 (H.C.
2006)); and Greece (Margellos and Others v. Federal Republic of Germany, 129
I.L.R.525 (Special Sup. Ct. 2002)); see also Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger.
v. It., Greece intervening), Judgment, 96 (Sept. 11, 2013, 11PM), http://www.icj-
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[Wlhile noting the growing recognition of the overriding
importance of the prohibition of torture, [the court] does not
accordingly find it established that there is yet acceptance in
international law of the proposition that States are not entitled to
immunity in respect of civil claims for damages for alleged
torture committed outside the forum State. 302
In Germany v. Italy, the ICJ also rejected the claim by Italy
and Greece that state immunity could not be invoked in cases
where rules endowed with a peremptory character had been
breached.3 03 The two States had argued that jus cogens
automatically displaced any hierarchically lower rule of customary
or treaty law, such as state immunity, that would hinder the
enforcement of the jus cogens rule.304 The ICJ ruled that the
gravity of the alleged crimes or their qualification as violations of
jus cogens norms were no ground for an exception to, or an
overriding of, state immunity.30 The court distinguished between
procedural and substantive rules and found that there was no
conflict between substantive jus cogens prohibitions on
enslavement, for instance, and procedural state immunity.30 6 The
court noted that this was consistent with the ICJ's rulings in
Armed Activities in the Congo and Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000, in which jus cogens did not confer jurisdiction or abrogate
cij.org/docket/index.php?pl=3&p2=2&case= 14 3&p3=0 ("The Court does not consider
the judgment of the French Cour de Cassation of Mar. 9, 2011 in La R6union adrienne v.
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (No. 09-14743, Mar. 9, 2011, Bull. civ., March 2011, No. 49,
49) as supporting a different conclusion. The Cour de Cassation in that case stated only
that, even if a jus cogens norm could constitute a legitimate restriction on state
immunity, such a restriction could not be justified on the facts of that case.").
302 Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.
§ 66.
303 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece intervening),
judgment, 1 61 (Sept. 11, 2013, 11PM), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php
?pl=3&p2=2&case=143&p3=0; see also id. 1 101 (holding that, in the context of state
immunity, it could "find no basis in the State practice from which customary
international law is derived that international law makes the entitlement of a State to
immunity dependent upon the existence of effective alternative means of securing
redress").
304 Id. 93.
305 Id. 105-06.
306 Id. 193-94.
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immunities of officials.307
The Dutch Supreme Court similarly rejected the argument that
the immunity of the United Nations did not apply because of the
gravity of the allegations of the claimants.' Should this principle
govern a case against the United Nations? The Supreme Court
offered nothing more than ipse dixit.309  However, there are
reasons to query this extension. The rationale behind state
immunity is quite different from that of the United Nations'
immunity. Besides reasons of international courtesy,3 10 state
immunity is predominantly derived from the principle of sovereign
equality of states, as generally expressed by the maxim par in
parem non habet imperium.3"l Other principles often invoked as
justifications for state immunity are the principle of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other states312 and the
inability of a national court to enforce its judgments against a
foreign state.1
In contrast, writing in 1944, the League of Nations' former
legal adviser McKinnon Wood gave three justifications for the
immunity of international organizations.3 14  First, international
organizations must have effective protection against biased
domestic courts.315 Second, they need effective protection against
"baseless actions brought from improper motives or by the
numerous cranks, fanatics or cantankerous persons who may
conceive that they have a duty to compel the organization to take
307 Id. 95.
308 See Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands & United Nations, 200.20.151/01,
4.3.7-3.14.
309 See id if 4.3.13-3.14.
310 See ISABELLE PINGEL-LENUZZA, LES IMMUNITES DES ETATS EN DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 20-27 (1997) (explaining on the non-legal foundations of the immunity
of states).
31 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 321 (6th ed.
2003).
312 PINGEL-LENUZZA, supra note 310.
313 HAZEL Fox, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 56-57 (2008).
314 Hugh McKinnon Wood, Legal Relations Between Individuals and a World
Organization of States, 30 GROTIUS Soc'Y TRANSACTIONS FOR THE YEAR 1944 141, 143-
44(1944).
315 See id.
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some particular step or that they have suffered wrong at its
hands."316 Third, international organizations require effective
protection against the possibility that member states will interpret
the legal effect of their acts in different, and possibly inconsistent,
ways. 17
Furthermore, in the cases cited above, Kuwait and Germany
invoked a rule of customary international law, specifically state
immunity, to avoid liability for an alleged violation of jus cogens.
In contrast, in Mothers of Srebrenica, the United Nations was
invoking a provision of a treaty, specifically Article 105 of the
Charter. Relevantly, Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties provides:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with
a peremptory norm of general international law. For the
purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of
general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having
the same character.3 18
While this provision does not apply to the U.N. Charter,
because the Vienna Convention is not retroactive,3 19 it strongly
suggests that there is a difference between applying a rule of jus
cogens to a treaty and applying it to any other kind of legal
dispute. If the sequence were reversed, that is, if the Vienna
Convention were older than the U.N. Charter, an infinite loop
would seemingly result, with Article 53 of the Vienna Convention
and Article 103 of the U.N. Charter each invalidating the other.
While hardly an uncontroversial position,3 20 Judge Elihu
Lauterpacht stated in the Bosnian Genocide case:
316 Id. at 144.
317 Id.
318 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 53. The
Vienna Convention also envisages the emergence of new peremptory norms of general
international law. Id art. 64.
319 Id. art. 4.
320 See Slobodan Milogevid v. State of the Netherlands, 41 I.L.M. 86, 3.5 (2001)
(holding that, on the basis of Article 103, the rules of the U.N. Charter and therefore
those of the U.N. Security Council prevail over "any other" set of rules).
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[T]he relief which Article 103 of the Charter may give the
Security Council in case of conflict between one of its decisions
and an operative treaty obligation cannot-as a matter of simple
hierarchy of norms-extend to a conflict between a Security
Council resolution and jus cogens.32 1
Of course, none of that ultimately would have saved the
plaintiffs' case. After all, they were not claiming that the United
Nations committed genocide or torture. The Dutch Court of
Appeal, applying the Beer and Reagan v. Germany and Waite and
Kennedy criteria, insinuated that it might have withdrawn the
U.N.'s immunity had the organization been accused of the "more
serious" crimes of committing or assisting in the commission of
genocide, as opposed to the "lesser" wrong of failing to prevent
the Srebrenica massacre.322 Although the Court of Appeal did not
explain its reason for drawing this distinction, it has been
suggested that the disparity can perhaps be justified on the basis of
the jus cogens nature of the prohibitions of genocide, versus the
treaty-norm status of the latter affirmative duties.32 3 Similarly,
regarding any jus cogens exception to Article 105, there is a
massive distinction between actually committing genocide and the
plaintiffs claim that the United Nations was negligent in
preventing the genocide.
VI. Limiting Immunity Based on the Lack of Functional
Necessity
If the competence of domestic courts to test U.N. immunity
321 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro), 1993 I.C.J. 439, 440
(Sept. 13, 1993) (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
322 See Dekker & Schechinger, supra note 255, at 6-7. They have also identified a
confusing aspect of this ruling. They point out that "the general interest connected with
[U.N.] immunity ... and the risk of abuse of domestic court proceedings would not
change [even if the United Nations had been accused of the 'more serious' offenses],
making it unlikely that the test of proportionality would result in a different outcome."
Id. at 6.
323 For more on the nature of the prohibition of genocide as ajus cogens norm, see
Andrea Gattini, Breach of the Obligation to Prevent and Reparation Thereof in the ICJ's
Genocide Judgment, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L 695, 697, 702 (2007); see also Stephen J. Toope,
Does International Law Impose a Duty Upon the United Nations to Prevent Genocide?,
46 McGILL L.J. 187 (2000).
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against other legislation or treaties is rejected, does this mean that
the United Nations has immunity for any action? Here, there
appears to be a tension between Article 105 of the Charter, which
provides the United Nations with "functional" immunity, and the
Convention, which provides the United Nations with "absolute"
immunity. The apparent functionally-limited grant of immunity
provided for in the Charter has historically been regarded as
embodying a standard of absolute immunity, insofar as
"international organizations can only act within the scope of their
functional personality there is no room left for non-functional acts
for which immunity would be denied."3 2 4  However, in recent
years many scholars have come to regard this approach as
overbroad, and instead encourage courts to adopt a "strict-
functionality" test that would limit the application of the U.N.'s
immunity to activities that are necessary for the exercise of its
functions or fulfilment of its purposes.3 25
The plaintiffs in Mothers of Srebrenica argued that the United
Nations could only possess a strict-functional immunity, on the
basis that "the Convention cannot extend further than the superior
ranked [U.N.] Charter."32 6  The Dutch Court of Appeal rejected
this approach, deciding that Article II, section 2 of the Convention
and Article 105(3) of the Charter granted the United Nations "the
most far-reaching immunity, in the sense that the [United Nations]
324 August Reinisch & Ulf Andreas Weber, In the Shadow of Waite and Kennedy, I
INT'L ORG. L. REV. 59, 63 (2004). Reinisch also noted that "the idea of functional
immunity is rather imprecise in so far as it could refer both to the rationale for granting
immunity at all. .. as well as to a certain content of immunity to be accorded." AUGUST
RErNISCH, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS 331 (2000).
Furthermore, "many scholars and judges consider. . . 'functional' and 'absolute' [to be]
synonymous qualifications." Id. at 332-33.
325 See, e.g., REINISCH, supra note 324, at 339-41; Jordan J. Paust, The UN Is
Bound By Human Rights: Understanding the Full Reach of Human Rights, Remedies and
Nonimmunity 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. ONLINE (2010); Emmanuel Gaillard & Isabelle Pingel-
Lenuzza, International Organisations and Immunity from Jurisdiction: To Restrict or to
Bypass, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 5 (2002).
326 Van Diepen van der Kroef, Statement ofAppeal, Apr. 7, 2009, 1 80, available at
http://www.vandiepen.com/fileadmin/userupload/Documenten/PDF/Screbrenical
Srebrenicastukken_Engels/5_-statement-of-appeal-_7-april-2009_.pdf; see also Hof,
Hague Mar. 30, 2010, 200.20.151/01, 1 4.2 (Mothers of Serbrenica/Netherlands &
United Nations) (Neth.), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/Netherlands/
Mothers-of Srebrenica JudgmentCourt of Appeal_30-03-2010.pdf.
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cannot be brought before any national court of law in the countries
that are a party to the Convention." 32 7 The Dutch Court of Appeal
is one of a few judicial institutions to have evaluated the scope of
the U.N.'s immunity on the basis of the international law
obligations embodied in the Convention and Charter, as opposed
to domestic laws that have incorporated those international law
obligations.328 Interestingly, the Dutch Court of Appeal decision
deviated from the precedent set by the Belgian Civil Tribunal in a
decision from several decades earlier. In Manderlier, the Belgian
Tribunal concluded that the Charter embodied only the immunities
that "necessity strictly demands for the fulfilment of the [U.N.'s]
purposes" but that these immunities had been expanded by Section
II of the Convention.3 2 9 The Dutch Court of Appeal turned this
analysis on its head, concluding that the Convention had not gone
"beyond the scope allowed by Article 105 of the Charter" in the
course of "implementing" the Charter protections.33 0
While the Charter does not restrict the U.N.'s immunity, it
does not extend indefinitely. For example, the OLA has
contended time and again that the immunity granted by the Charter
and Convention does not extend to commercial enterprises, '3  a
327 Mothers of Srebrenica, 200.20.151/01,14.2.
328 Most domestic courts assess the scope of immunity granted to an international
organization on the basis of domestic legislation providing for such immunity. See
Entico Corporation Limited, supra note 270, at 485 (assessing the immunity of
UNESCO in light of the International Organizations Act of 1968); see also De Luca v.
United Nations, 841 F. Supp. 531, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (considering the immunity of the
United Nations in light of the International Organizations Immunities Act).
329 Tribunale de Premi& Instance [Civ.] [Tribunal of First Instance] Brussels, May
11, 1966, 45 ILR 1972, 453 (Belg.).
330 Mothers of Srebrenica, 200.20.151/01,14.4.
331 See Office of Legal Affairs, Advisability of the United Nations Entering Into a
Profit-making Joint Venture with a Private Publishing Firm - Purpose of the Current
Commercially Oriented Activities of the United Nations-Participation in a Profit-
Oriented Commercial Joint Venture Could put the Status and Character of the
Organization in Question, 1990 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 257, 258, U.N. Sales No. E.93.V.1
(acknowledging that if "the Organization were to participate in a commercial joint
venture, it would .. . have to waive its privileges and immunities, the granting of which
would no longer be justified"); see also Anthony Miller, The Privileges and Immunities
of the United Nations, 6 INT'L ORG. L. REv. 7, 21 n.45 (2009) (describing other incidents
in which the OLA of the U.N. has recommended against undertaking activity, on the
grounds that it would exceed the functional mandate of the U.N. and expose it to
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view that was recently affirmed by the High Court of Kenya.3 32
This acknowledgment comports with the U.N. General
Assembly's view that immunities have an "outer limit" beyond
which "no privileges and immunities which are not really
necessary should be asked for."333 The OLA has gone further and
acknowledged that the manner in which the United Nations
executes its mandate may impact the scope of the U.N.'s
immunity.3 34 The OLA acknowledged that participation in a
competitive bidding process by U.N. subsidiary organs, even when
the bidding was done in order to assist States, might strip the U.N.
subsidiary organ of its immunity before domestic courts.335 The
restrictive nature of the United Nations' immunity is strengthened
by the opinion of the ICJ in the Certain Expenses of the United
Nations case, which determined that the purposes of the United
Nation "are broad indeed, but neither they nor the powers
conferred to effectuate them are unlimited." 33 6
Nonetheless, scholars have asserted that international
liability); see also Rawski, supra note 80, at 123 ("In summary, application of the
Convention has been inconsistent and [United Nations] rhetoric has been confused. At
various times, both the broad and narrow interpretations of immunity protections have
been invoked, with [U.N.] officials sometimes calling for a waiver and other times
defining certain activities outside the scope of immunity.").
332 Tanad Transporters Ltd. v United Nations Children's Fund (2009) eK.L.R., 1, 3
(C.C.K.) (Kenya), reprinted in 2009 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 487, U.N. DOC.
ST/LEG/SER.C/47 (holding that "for the applicant to succeed in its claim that this court
has jurisdiction to hear the dispute, it must establish that the commercial activity
exercised by the respondent is outside its official function. In the present application, it is
clear that the transport agreement between the applicant and the respondent related to the
official function of the respondent.").
333 G.A. Res. 22(I) § D, U.N. Doc. A/RES/22(I)[A-F], at 33 (Feb. 1, 1946).
334 See Office of Legal Affairs, supra note 331, at 258.
335 General Legal Division of the Office of Legal Affairs, Participation of
Organizations of the United Nations system in Competitive Bidding Exercises Conducted
by Governments, 1999 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 418, 423, U.N. DOC. ST/LEG/SER.C/37 ("If the
practice of United Nations system organizations competing with private companies for
business were to be pursued, it cannot be a priori excluded that the immunity of such
organizations might be challenged in court. Whether this would occur and the possible
results are difficult to predict. Even if the United Nations system organizations were to
prevail in such legal actions, the institution of such actions conceivably could have other
implications.").
336 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Art. 17, para. 2, of the Charter),
Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (July 20, 1962).
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immunities have expanded... to the point where their
implementing treaties resemble the doctrine of absolute state
immunity33 8 because complete jurisdictional immunity may seem
"excessive" in light of the minimum immunities necessary for the
United Nations to perform its functions.33 9 Scholars frequently
have questioned whether the United Nations requires immunity
from every suit brought by victims of traffic accidents.34 0
Proposals for reform generally draw analogies to restricted state
immunity. The shift toward a restrictive approach to state
immunity originated with a decision of the Supreme Court of
Austria in 1950,34 as well as the Tate letter of the United States
337 See Singer, supra note 105, at 56 (arguing "as jurisdictional immunity has
waned for states, it has waxed for international organizations"); see also Hammerschlag,
supra note 105, at 282 (describing "a long line of rulings that have expanded immunity
for international organizations").
338 See, e.g., Boimah v. United Nations Gen. Assembly, 664 F. Supp. 69, 71
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (describing the Convention as creating "absolute" immunity); FELICE
MORGENSTERN, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 6 (1986)
(referring to the "absolute" immunity of international organizations); Walter Gary Sharp,
Sr., Protecting the Avatars of International Peace and Security, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 93, 128 (1996) (stating that the Convention "creates a system of absolute immunity
for the property, funds, and assets of the United Nations"); Farrugia, supra note 8, at 513
(stating that "international organizations still have absolute immunity, although foreign
government immunity is now restricted"); Henderson, supra note 10, at 487 n.6
(asserting that he United Nations Charter grants the United Nations "complete
immunity" from all legal process); Lewis, supra note 8, at 686 (noting that most
international organizations "define their immunities from legal process as absolute," and
stating that the language of the Charter "was intended ... to confer absolute immunity").
339 See Special Rapporteur on Status, Privileges and Immunities of International
Organizations, Their Officials, Experts, etc., Fourth Rep. on Relations Between States
and International Organizations, 59, Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/424 (Apr.
24, 1989) (by Leonardo Diaz Gonzdlez); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
112, at § 467 rep. n. 4.
340 See Singer, supra note 105, at 128, 141 (emphasizing that functional necessity
secures only the minimum immunities necessary for international organizations and does
not guarantee them immunity from all routine transactions, much less a "quiet" or
"charmed" existence); see also Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental
Organizations, 91 YALE L.J. 1167, 1190 (1982) ("Merely allowing a suit in tort against
an intergovernmental organization seems unlikely to constitute an overly intrusive
interference with its core activities."); see also Westchester Cnty. v. Ranollo, 187 Misc.
777, 780, 67 N.Y.S.2d 31, 34 (City Ct. 1946) (refusing to believe that every employee of
an international organization requires immunity for official acts without regard to the
importance of his or her functions).
341 Dralle v. Republic of Czechoslovakia, 17 I.L.R. 155 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (Austria).
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State Department in 1952,342 which observed the increased activity
of States in commercial activities. As the U.K. Privy Council
observed in Philippine Admiral, the restrictive theory is more
consonant with justice:
In this country-and no doubt in most countries in the western
world-the state can be sued in its own courts on commercial
contracts into which it has entered and there is no apparent
reason why foreign states should not be equally liable to be sued
there in respect of such transactions.3 43
Over the following years, the courts in many civil and
common law states adopted a distinction between absolute
immunity for acts jure imperii and restrictive immunity for acts
jure gestionis.34 In the context of U.N. immunity, a number of
scholars have suggested that the doctrine of restricted state
immunity should either be applied en bloc 345 or provide a model
342 Letter of Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, to Philip B.
Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1954),
reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-15 (1976).
343 Owners of the Philippine Admiral v. Wallem Shipping Ltd, [1977] A.C. 373
(P.C.) (appeal taken from H.K.).
344 See BROWNLIE, supra note 311, at 323 n.24. The development of the doctrine of
restrictive immunity provides an example of how national courts can lead a change in
international law. The decision of Lord Denning in Trendtex Trading Corporation v.
Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] Q.B. 529 takes a robust view of the capacity of the
courts to observe, change, and implement international law; see MALCOLM SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 628-31 (2003). Legislation adopting this distinction in one form or
another has been passed in the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Singapore,
Pakistan, Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand. See UNITED NATIONS, MATERIAL ON
JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY (1982); Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (U.S.); State Immunity Act, 1978, 33 (U.K.);
Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) (Austl.); State Immunity Act (Act No.
19/1979) (Sing.); State Immunity Ordinance (Act No. 6/1981) (Pak.); Foreign State
Immunity Act 87 of 1981 (S Afr.); Canada's State Immunity Act RS 1985 c S-18. The
courts of Spain, South Africa, and France have also applied a restrictive approach. For
the leading cases, see BROWNLIE, supra note 311 at 323 n.25.
345 See DEREK BOWETT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 362 (1982)
(predicting that, as international organizations expanded, there would be greater
justification for applying the doctrine of restricted state immunity to their activities);
Letter Roberts B. Owen, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, to Leroy D. Clark,
General Counsel to the EEOC (June 24, 1980), reprinted in Marian L. Nash,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 74 AM. J.
INT'L L. 917, 917 (1980) (concluding that international organizations enjoy the same
restricted immunity as foreign states); Thomas O'Toole, Sovereign Immunity Redivus:
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for the immunity of international organizations and their
personnel.346 In particular, it has been suggested that, if foreign
states can function with restricted immunity, domestic courts
should require international organizations to do the same.347
However, despite suggestions from scholarship3 48  and a
relatively small number of decisions of domestic courts,349 the
division between actsjure imperii and acts jure gestionis is neither
relevant nor transportable to international organizations.3 so The
legal foundation of the United Nations' immunity and state
immunity are fundamentally different. As rightly pointed out by
Higgins, the question of whether the immunity is necessary for the
fulfilment of the organization's purpose cannot be answered by
reference to the division between acts jure imperii and acts jure
gestionis."' Additionally, domestic courts have generally been
Suits Against International Organizations, 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 1, 14-16
(1980) (arguing that international organizations, like foreign states, should not enjoy
immunity for commercial activities); John C. Griffith, Jr., Note, Restricting the Immunity
of International Organizations in Labor Disputes: Reforming an Obsolete Shibboleth, 25
VA. J. INT'L L. 1007, 1033 (1985) (suggesting that restrictive state immunity principles
should be applied to international organizations); Note, The Status of International
Organizations Under the Law of the United States, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1300, 1312 (1958).
346 See Singer, supra note 105, at 65 (proposing to draw on foreign state immunity
concepts in defining the scope of international immunities); see also Note, Jurisdictional
Immunities of Intergovernmental Organizations, supra note 340, at 1191-92 (proposing
limited restrictions that would harmonize international immunities in conformity with
trends in state immunity law); see also BEKKER, supra note 10, at 163 (proposing to draw
a modest analogy to foreign state immunity by distinguishing between the nature of
activities performed by international organizations).
347 Singer, supra note 105, at 135.
348 See, e.g., Gaillard & Pingel-Lenuzza, supra note 325, at 9-10; Hertz, supra note
31, at 524-31.
349 See REINISCH, supra note 324, at 185-205. Such a trend is particularly visible in
Italian Courts. See, e.g., Cass., 29 Ottobre 1992, n. 11781, Foro it. I (It.), reprinted in
1992 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 506, U.N. Sales No. 97.V.8.
350 See Fox, supra note 313, at 727. In the literature it has also been asserted that
there is no distinction between acts jure imperii and acts jure gestionis in international
organization law. See CHITTHARANJAN FlLIX AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAw 328 (2003).
351 HIGGINS, supra note 6, at 93; see also Christian Dominic6, L 'immunite de
juridiction et d'ex&ution des organisations internationales, 187 RECUEIL DES COURS
145, 179-80 (1984 IV) (criticizing the Italian courts' application of the allegedly implicit
restrictive immunity standard to international organizations, pursuant to the distinction
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unwilling to recognize exceptions to the immunity of international
organizations under customary international law for acts jure
gestionis. An Austrian court, hearing a case against the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Fund for
International Development, the immunity of which was laid down
in a headquarters agreement with Austria, put the issue
unequivocally as:
Comparing the nature of the immunity of international
organizations to that of states while foreign states, according to
domestic law and prevailing international law, solely enjoy
immunity for sovereign acts and not in their capacity as subjects
of private rights and duties, the immunity of international
organizations is-within the scope of their functional
restrictions-in principle to be regarded as absolute. 352
In a similar vein, a Swiss court pointed out that the immunity
of international organizations bore no similarity to the immunity
of States, the latter being limited, but the former ordinarily being
absolute in accordance with the relevant headquarters
agreement.5 A Danish court also ruled that UNICEF should be
considered immune from jurisdiction relating to a dispute of a civil
law nature, excluding an exception for acts jure gestionis.354
Under the restrictive approach to state immunity, domestic
courts determine whether they have jurisdiction over the subject
matter or if the State enjoys immunity. In contrast, under so-
called absolute immunity, the United Nations determines whether
between acts jure imperii and acts jure gestionis "imported" from the law of state
immunity).
352 Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Dec. 14, 2004, docket No. 10 Ob
53/04 y (Austria), at Bundeskanzleramt Rechtsinformationsystem [BKA/RIS]
http://www.ris2.bka.gv.at, document No. JJT 20041214 OGH0002 01000B00053
04YO000000 (Austria).
353 Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] July 2, 2004, 130
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] 1 312 (Switz.),
available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:ildc/344ch04.case.1/law-ildc-
344ch04?rskey=aVVIeA&result=4&q=Consortium%20X%20v.%20Swiss%20Federal%
20Government&prd=OPIL.
354 The Investment & Finance Company of 11 January 1984 Ltd v. UNICEF, U
2000 478 0, Aug. 26, 1999 (Den.) available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/
10.1093/law:ildc/64dk99.case. 1/law-ildc-64dk99?rskey=UrpF45&result-1&q=U%202
000%20478%20%C3%98&prd=ORIL.
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domestic courts have jurisdiction by waiving immunity... or
whether it is obliged to provide "appropriate modes of settlement."
In this context, immunity does not equate to impunity but is better
regarded as a forum selection rule. Unlike diplomatic immunity,
where waiver remains a right of the sending state,"' the
Convention creates an obligation for the Secretary-General to
waive the immunities of U.N. personnel whenever the assertion of
immunity would "impede the course of justice" and waiver may be
accomplished without prejudice to the United Nations.357
With respect to tort actions brought by non-employees,
automobile accidents provide the most common source of dispute
and the one area in which the United Nations consistently waives
its immunity.358 To the extent that it carries third-party insurance,
355 Sections 20 and 23 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations contain two waiver provisions. They read:
Section 20
Privileges and immunities are granted to officials in the interests of the United
Nations and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The
Secretary-General shall have the right and the duty to waive the immunity of
any official in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the
course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the
United Nations. In the case of the Secretary-General, the Security Council shall
have the right to waive immunity.
Section 23
Privileges and immunities are granted to experts in the interests of the United
Nations and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The
Secretary-General shall have the right and the duty to waive the immunity of
any expert in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the
course of justice and it can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the
United Nations.
356 LINDA S. FREY & MARSHA L FREY, THE HISTORY OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 561
(1999) (stating, in the context of diplomatic immunity, that waiver "is more a moral than
a legal obligation").
357 HILL, supra note 14, at 109-11 (describing the Convention's mandatory waiver
as an innovation).
358 See, e.g., Relations Between States and International Organizations (Second
Part of the Topic), [1985] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 145, 162, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.383
and Add. 1-3; Letter dated May 22, 1985 from the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to the
Permanent Representative of a Member State, 1985 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 155, U.N. Doc
ST/LEG/SER.C/23; Memorandum dated Apr. 5, 1983 from the U.N. Office of Legal
Affairs to the Assistant Secretary-General for General Services, 1983 U.N. Jurid. Y.B.
215, U.N. Doc STILEG/SER.C/21; Internal Memorandum dated Nov. 3, 1964 of the UN
Office of Legal Affairs, 1964 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 263, U.N. Doc STILEG/SER.C/2;
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the United Nations has also waived its immunity for other tort
claims.359 Immunity has also been denied in both Kosovo and East
Timor after evidence of involvement of serious crimes has come to
light. For example, members of the U.N. civilian police accused
of rape in Mitrovica and murder in Pristina have had immunity
protections waived.36 o
When two Jordanian U.N. civilian police were arrested for
allegedly raping an East Timorese woman employed as a cleaner
in a hotel in Dili, the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General announced that the officers would not enjoy immunity
from legal process and would be tried in East Timorese courts. 3 6 1
After an investigation by a U.N.-convened Board of Inquiry, the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General decided that rape
could not be construed as an "official" or "necessary" act and that
consequently, a waiver from the Secretary-General was
unnecessary because immunity did not attach.3 62 The East Timor
Prosecutor General subsequently indicted the officers.
Waiver is only required after the Secretary-General determines
BEKKER,supra note 10, at 205.
359 See, e.g., Fourth Report on Relations Between States and International
Organizations, supra note 339, at 162; Reply dated Feb. 26, 1976 by the UN Office of
Legal Affairs to a Questionnaire from the Institut de Droit International, 1976 U.N.
Jurid. Y.B. 163, U.N. Doc ST/LEG/SER.C/14; BEKKER, supra note 10, at 204; Singer,
supra note 105, at 85.
360 Rawski, supra note 80, at 119.
361 A spokesman for the Secretary-General in New York subsequently explained
that the Secretary-General would waive the immunity of the U.N. civilian police and
that, because they were not peacekeepers, he could do so without the approval of the
Jordanian government. See U.N. Policeman Charged with Rape in East Timor, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE (Aug. 26, 2001), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/
Inacademic/.
362 Rawski, supra note 80, at 120. This decision came only after an internal debate
within the mission, in which sections argued that the U.N. civilian police were covered
by the Convention's immunity provisions during their entire time on mission, that
immunity protection is not contingent on the nature of the particular act in question, and
that the arrests were therefore unlawful.
363 See Daily Briefing, UNTAET, Two Police Officers Detained in Connection
with Rape (July 6, 2001), available at http://reliefweb.int/report/timor-leste/untaet-daily-
briefing-06-jul-2001; Daily Briefing, UNTAET, Jordanian Civilian Police Indicted on
Rape Charges (Aug. 24, 2001), available at http://reliefweb.int/report/timor-leste/untaet-
daily-briefing-24-aug-2001.
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that immunity would impede the course of justice and that waiver
would not prejudice the interests of the Organization "in his
opinion."" However, the United Nations Legal Counsel has
recognized that the Secretary-General's waiver decisions are
reviewable by the ICJ. 6' As a result, waiver becomes a frequent
duty of the United Nations and a serious structural limitation of its
immunity.3 66 It hangs "like a permanent threat over the heads of
officials who might otherwise [be] inclined to abuse their
position" and can provide a remedy for victims of abuse.367 In line
with the concept of functional necessity, the United Nations seems
unwilling to waive immunity when claimants accuse its personnel
of committing intentional torts in their official capacity.
Many writers claim that the Convention requires the United
Nations to waive the immunities of its personnel but not its own
immunity.369 While this view enjoys popular support, it has been
364 Convention, supra note 18, art. 5-6, §§ 20, 23. While there has been no
comprehensive statement from the Secretary-General's office about when waiver is
obligatory, there are indications that, in cases of "serious breaches" of international law,
refusal to waive immunity would violate Sections 20 and 23. See Working Paper
submitted by Japan, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Sec II 2(2) at 4, U.N. Doc. BWC/AD HOC
GROUP/WP.52 (Dec. 8, 1995).
365 See Oral Statement of the United Nations, supra note 30, TT 59-61; see also
Written Statement of Federal Republic of Germany, Difference Relating to Immunity
from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights,
Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62 (Apr. 29) (assuming that the ICJ has the authority to
review the Secretary-General's decisions on waiver).
366 See BOWETr, supra note 345, at 377 (explaining that "waiver is often a duty
imposed on the organisation").
367 See EGON RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER, THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT 266
(1945) (describing the effect of potential waivers of diplomatic immunities on League of
Nations officials); see also Jacques Secretan, The Independence Granted to Agents ofthe
International Community in Their Relations with National Public Authorities, 16 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 56, 72 (1935) (arguing that "[t]he right to waive immunities, vested in the
authority which appoints the agent in question, is a sufficient guarantee that cases of
denial ofjustice will not occur").
368 See Reply dated Feb. 26, 1976 by the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs to a
Questionnaire from the Institut de Droit International, supra note 359, at 172, 176
(explaining that the United Nations does not generally waive immunity except in cases
of third-party liability that is covered by insurance).
369 See BEKKER, supra note 10, at 192 (stating that international organizations have
no legal duty to waive their own immunities and that the decision to waive immunity is
usually left to the discretion of the organization); see also WILFRED JENKS,
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argued that it reflects an incomplete understanding of the
Convention.37 0 When the United Nations waives the immunity of
its personnel for official acts, it waives a manifestation of its own
immunity,371 assumes responsibility for the underlying conduct,37 2
and undertakes to indemnify its agents against any damage
awards.3 73 In this sense, the express duty of waiver indirectly
applies to the United Nations' "own" immunity, at least in cases
where the claimants join U.N. personnel as defendants.37 4
Therefore, as with U.N. officials, the key question is who
INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES 45 (1961) (stating that there is "no corresponding 'right and
duty' . . . of the organization" to waive its immunity).
370 Brower, supra note 10, at 31-32 (arguing that the "immunity of [U.N.]
personnel for official acts and the immunity of the Organization are inseparable because
the former constitute a manifestation of the latter").
371 A few writers have suggested that the waiver of immunity of agents for official
acts has no logical place in the framework of U.N. immunity. U.N. personnel possess
immunity for official acts because they constitute the acts of the U.N. itself. Therefore,
as a technical matter, the officials' immunity should not be waived; the immunity of the
U.N. should be waived. See MARJORIE WHITEMAN, 13 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
155 (1968).
372 Oral Statement of the United Nations, supra note 30, 14 ("By determining that
the words spoken by Mr. Cumaraswamy were performed during the performance of the
mission for the United Nations, the words complained of are now the responsibility of
the United Nations.").
373 Written Statement Submitted on Behalf of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, supra note 100, T 64 (recognizing that an expert on mission was "entitled to be
reimbursed by the United Nations for any . .. costs, expenses or damages" resulting from
a defamation suit arising out of his official activities); Oral Statement of the United
Nations, supra note 30, 46 (reaching the same conclusion).
374 As the U.N. acts (and commits legal wrongs) only through its personnel,
claimants can generally join them as defendants. See, e.g., The Practice of the United
Nations, the Specialized Agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency
Concerning Their Status, Privileges and Immunities: A Study Prepared by the
Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L. 118 (May 23, 1967), reprinted in [1967] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 223 n.50 (observing that, in Curran v. City of New York, 77 N.Y.S.2d 266
(Sup. Ct. 1947), the plaintiff effectively joined the United Nations by suing the
Secretary-General in a representative capacity); Donald v. Orfila, 788 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (involving a tort claim by a former employee against the Secretary-General of the
Organization of American States); Askir v. Boutros-Ghali, 933 F. Supp. 368, 370 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (involving tort and statutory claims by a private party against United
Nations officials and acknowledging that such claims are effectively actions against the
United Nations itself); De Luca v. United Nations Org., 841 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (involving contract, tort, and statutory claims by a former U.N. employee against
the United Nations and individual U.N. officers).
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should make the determination of whether immunity initially
applies. By introducing a duty to waive unnecessary immunities,
the Convention preserves the conceptual framework of functional
necessity but vests the Secretary-General with the primary
authority for its application. 375 The principal rationale for granting
absolute immunity from legal process to the United Nations lies in
securing its independence and guaranteeing its functioning.3 76 It is
relatively uncontroversial that "[tihe privileges and immunities of
international organizations are designed mainly to protect the
independence of organizations from undue outside influence and
otherwise to ensure that they are able to carry out their mission." 3 7 7
Many court decisions involving the immunity from suit of
international organizations incorporate the independent
functioning argument. For example, courts note the grant of
immunity "in order to facilitate the working of an international
body," 3 7 8 to "ensure its functioning,"3 79  and "to avoid ...
hindrances to the independent functioning."' Immunity from suit
may also be necessary to protect international organizations
against a potentially hostile environment,"' against "unilateral and
sometimes irresponsible interference by individual
governments,"38 2 and against a general danger of prejudice against
375 See Brower, supra note 10, at 30; see also Peter Bekker, International Decision:
Differences Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 913, 921 (1999) (stating that "[t]he
object and purpose of [the mandatory waiver provisions] is to assign a central role to the
Secretary-General in the case of immunity questions arising under the Convention").
376 REINISCH, supra note 324, at 233.
377 COVEY OLIVER, EDwiN FIRMAGE, CHRISTOPHER BLAKESLEY, RICHARD ScoTT &
SHARON WILLIAMS, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 613 (1995); see also Glenn,
supra note 9, at 276 (speaking of the "indispensability of jurisdictional immunity to the
effective functioning of international organizations").
378 Ary Spaans v. The Netherlands, App. No. 12516/86, 58 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 119
(1988), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-269.
379 REINISCH, supra note 324, 191 (discussing the reasoning of the court in X v.
International Centre for Superior Mediterranean Agricultural Studies, Court of Appeals
of Crete (1991)).
380 Case 4/62, Application for Authorization to Enforce a Garnishee Order Against
the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, 1962 E.C.R. 42.
381 Jean-Flavien Lalive, L'immuniWt de juridiction des itats et des organisations
internationales, 84 RECUEIL DES COURs 205, 298-303 (1953 III).
382 Paul Szasz, International Organizations, Privileges and Immunities, in 2
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international organizations among judges.383 While these
prejudices may be imperceptible in the stable environment of
major western capitals,38 4 it is unhelpful to judge U.N. immunities
by reference to the situations where they are needed least.38 5
Additionally, it is sometimes argued that domestic judges may
not be trained well enough in international matters in order to
decided issues concerning the United Nations.3 86 However, it has
been suggested that the failure to waive immunity for intentional
torts is unwarranted because the United Nations never requires
immunity "in cases alleging that they have intentionally caused
death, personal injury, or damage to .. . property within the forum
state."387 This argument is appealing, given that, when domestic
law governs a tort claim, international organizations are less
justified in citing the limited perspective of municipal courts or the
possibility of conflicting judgments to justify the assertion of
immunity.38 8 Actually, in these tort cases, domestic courts may be
in the best position to apply the governing law.389
Still, a blanket rule against immunity fails to consider the
nature of situations in which the United Nations and its officials
are likely to commit international torts.390 The cases discussed in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1325-26 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1995).
383 KULJIT AHLUWALIA, THE LEGAL STATUS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE
SPECIALIZED AGENCIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND CERTAIN OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 200 (1964); BOWETr, supra note 345, at 349; BEKKER, supra note 10, at
101; Dominic6, supra note 351, at 159; HENRY SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONAL LAW 796 (1980).
384 For example, during the inter-war period, critics asserted that the League of
Nations did not require immunities because its seat was located in a "civilized country."
FREY & FREY, supra note 356, at 552, 593; see also Wood, supra note 314, at 143-44
(recognizing that international organizations have little reason to fear the possibility of
bad faith or prejudice in the domestic courts of countries like Switzerland).
385 See BEKKER, supra note 10, at 207 (quoting JENKS, supra note 369, at xxxvi, for
the proposition that "the need for [international] immunities must be gauged not by the
extent to which they are necessary or useful in everyday life in a well-ordered capital but
by their potential importance in emergencies").
386 REINISCH, supra note 324, at 234.
387 Singer, supra note 105, at 151.
388 Id. at 130.
389 Wood, supra note 314, at 162.
390 Brower, supra note 10, at 64.
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this Article generally involve purposeful activities that the United
Nations has determined to be part of its official work. When the
tort claims involve circumstances in which the United Nations
concludes that it has a right under international law to perform acts
that would otherwise be actionable under domestic law, it is not
clear that domestic courts should adjudicate the rights and
liabilities of the Organization and its personnel.39 ' For example,
when the Security Council controls military enforcement actions
in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, members of the
participating force should not be exposed to domestic court
jurisdiction for claims of personal injury and property damage that
might otherwise lie under domestic law. When member states
require the United Nations to issue reports on particular topics,
their authors should not face domestic court jurisdiction for
defamation claims that might arise under domestic laws.
International officials are unlikely to commit intentional
violations of domestic tort law in the absence of a colorable claim
that they have a right to do so under international law.392 While
such claims may not always be justified, it is not unreasonable to
be even more suspicious of attempts by domestic courts to resolve
conflicts between international law and domestic tort law.393
Instead, the influence of member states on the activities of the
United Nations should be channelled through its "internal law."
These are laid down in its founding treaties, its organizational
practice, and the rules emanating from organs of the
organization. 394 The United Nations should be protected from the
adjudicative power of national courts to ensure both clearly
defined decision-making processes and budgetary procedures that
lay down the options available to States to exercise influence
within the United Nations are not circumvented by external
"commands" addressed to the United Nations through any state
organs, and in particular, through courts.3 95
391 Id.
392 Id. at 65.
393 Id.
394 See generally Rudolf Bernhardt, Qualifikation und Anwendungsbereich des
internaen Rechts internationaler Organisationen, 12 BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN
GESELLSCHAFT FUR VOLKERRECHT 7 (1973).
395 Szasz, supra note 382, at 1326.
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This consideration was one of the main arguments raised in the
United Nations amicus curiae brief in the Broadbent v. OAS
case.3 96  To justify a scope of immunity for international
organizations different from that of states, the United Nations
reasoned:
Intergovernmental organizations may be considered as collective
enterprises of their member States. Their constituent treaties
define precisely the influence each member is to have on the
operations of the organizations, and how that influence is to be
exercised-generally through collective organs. If individual
members could then exert additional influence on those
organizations, largely through the fortuitous circumstances of
where their headquarters, or other offices or officials or assets,
happen to be located this could drastically change the
constitutionally agreed sharing of power within the
organizations. Thus the immunity granted by States to an
intergovernmental organization is really their reciprocal pledge
that none will attempt to garner unilaterally an undue share of
influence over its affairs.3 9 7
Under these circumstances, the assertion of immunity
represents a legitimate effort by the United Nations to transfer the
adjudication of liability to international "appropriate modes of
settlement" and, thus, to ensure the primacy of international law.39 8
Finally, though frequently considered as an aspect of the
attempt to secure the organization's independence,3 99 the negative
effect of inconsistent judgments by various domestic courts and
the lack of any harmonization mechanism also support the grant of
immunity from domestic lawsuits.400 It has been argued that an
396 Broadbent v. Org. of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
397 Brief for the United Nations as Amicus Curiae, Broadbent v. Org. of Am.
States, 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (No. 78-1465), reprinted in 1980 U.N. Jurid. Y.B.
227, 229.
398 Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental Organizations, supra note
340, at 1]90-91.
399 See BEKKER, supra note 10, at 102-03.
400 See AHLUWALIA, supra note 383, at 302; BOWETT, supra note 345, at 349; see
also HANS-JOACHIM PRIESS, INTERNATIONALE VERWALTUNGSGERICHTE UND
BESCHWERDEAUSSCHOSSE, EINE STUDIE ZUM GERICHTLICHEN RECHTSSCHUTZ FOR BEAMTE
INTERNATIONALER ORGANISATIONEN 53 (1989); see also SCHERMERS, supra note 383, at
796; see also Wood, supra note 314, at 144.
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organization created for the common interest of its member states
"must therefore speak with one voice and can only regulate its
legal relations through one uniform body of law." 40 1 The most
effective way to achieve a "modicum of uniformity" in
interpretation is for "all States concerned [] to pay serious heed to
one another's case law."4 0 2  As Judge Simma of the ICJ has
argued, the growing importance of domestic jurisprudence for
international law's development brings with it an "increasing
responsibility on the part of these courts to maintain the law's
coherence and integrity."4 03 In this context, it is problematic how
infrequently domestic courts look to other foreign decisions
regarding the immunity of the United Nations.40 4
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not
require consistent interpretation; instead it calls for treaties to be
interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose."0 However, subsequent practice
of treaty parties (including decisions of their national courts) may
401 BEKKER, supra note 10, at 103.
402 Roderick Mundy, The Uniform Interpretation of International Conventions, 27
INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 450, 458-59 (1978); see also KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KoTZ, AN
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 27-28 (1998).
403 Bruno Simma, Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a
Practitioner, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 265, 290 (2009).
404 In April 2011 the University of Vienna hosted a conference which is expected to
lead to an edited volume AUGUST REINISCH, TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL DIALOGUE OF
DOMESTIC COURTS ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (forthcoming 2013).
Contributors noted:
Regarding the Netherlands, Rosanne van Alebeeck and Andr6 Nollkaemper had "found
only two cases in which a Dutch court expressly referred to another national court when
deciding a question related to [international organization] immunity; the proverbial
exceptions that prove the rule." Regarding the United Kingdom, Dan Sarooshi and
Antonios Tzanakopulos concluded that "[o]n the issues of personality and immunity the
UK courts have been relatively conservative in their approach by relying almost
exclusively on the construction of the [International Organizations] Act [1968] and
implementing Orders in Council (secondary legislation)." Regarding Italy, Riccardo
Pavoni endorsed the "characterization of Italian case law on [international organizations]
as isolationist, although not by reference to the substantive correctness of the court
findings in the various cases, but precisely for its disregard of foreign and international
court decisions."
405 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
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provide evidence of an agreement on interpretation.4 06 Even some
of the most vocal opponents of the citation of foreign decisions in
other contexts recognize the importance of engaging in
comparative analysis of various domestic court decisions when
interpreting treaties. Despite his vociferous objections to the use
of foreign decisions in constitutional interpretation, Justice Scalia
states that "[w]hen federal courts interpret a treaty to which the
United States is a party, they should give considerable respect to
the interpretation of the same treaty by the courts of other
signatories," because "[o]therwise the whole object of the treaty,
which is to establish a single, agreed-upon regime governing the
actions of all the signatories, will be frustrated."40 7
VII. Towards Best Practices
The Convention, as a matter of international policy, vested the
United Nations with an obligation to waive immunity or to make
available an alternative means of settlement.40 8 With respect to
torts claims, the ICJ in Cumaraswamy confirmed that:
[A]ny such claims against the United Nations shall not be dealt
with by national courts but shall be settled in accordance with
the appropriate modes of settlement that "[t]he United Nations
shall make provisions for" pursuant to Section 29.409
Instead, when plaintiffs are unsatisfied by the "appropriate
406 Id. art. 31(3)(b). The threshold for establishing such an agreement is meant to
be high, requiring "concordant, common and consistent" practice that "is sufficient to
establish a discernible pattern implying the agreement of the parties regarding
interpretation." See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 12-13,
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS I 0/AB/R, WT/DS 11 /AB/R (adopted Nov. 1, 1996) (quoting IAN
SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 137 (1984)). However,
not all treaty parties are required to have engaged in such practice; it may be sufficient
for some to have done so and others to have assented to or acquiesced in the practice.
See RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 227, 235-39 (2008); see also MARK
VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
431 (2009).
407 Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal
Courts, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 305, 305 (2004); see also Norman Dorsen, The
Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in US. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation
Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT. J. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 519, 521 (2005).
408 Miller, supra note 331, at 97.
409 Cumaraswamy, supra note 19, T 66.
2014 329
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
modes of settlement" offered by the United Nations, they often
attempt to seek recourse against troop-contributing countries. 4 10 It
seems settled that the "effective control" test of Draft Articles is
the relevant standard for determining whether the conduct is
attributable to the United Nations, the troop-contributing country,
or both. Various courts have construed this as narrowly as
"ultimate authority and control" in Behrami and as broadly as
"power to prevent" in Nuhanovid.4 1' There are three scenarios in
which the "effective control" test might be applied: a general
authorization by the Security Council for member states to take
action, such as in Libya; a specifically authorized force, not
operationally controlled by the United Nations, such as KFOR;
and the classic U.N. peacekeeper blue-helmets. How will courts
rule on attribution in these cases going forward?
It is clear from Al-Jedda and ILC commentary that wrongs
committed by forces that were merely authorized by the Security
Council cannot be attributable to the United Nations. Regarding
the second scenario, given the response to the Behrami decision by
academics, the ILC, and the United Nations and that the ECtHR
found means to distinguish Al-Jedda from it, future rulings will
likely not find attribution to the United Nations. Consequently, it
is likely that most future applications will be found in the third
scenario, which is most similar to Nuhanovid. Given that
attribution was factually based on the active involvement of the
Netherlands in the evacuation process and the mission had ended
de facto, great caution should be exercised in using the judgment
as a possible basis for other claims. However, when both the
United Nations and the troop-contributing country have normative
control and are involved factually, dual attribution may be the
appropriate disposition.4 12
If the actions are attributable to the United Nations, plaintiffs
have sought to limit its immunity by invoking the right of access
to court.413 The ECtHR in Behrami and Saramati did not
unequivocally state that Article 103 took precedence over the
410 See supra Part IV.
411 See Behrami, supra note 147, 133; Nuhanovid, 200.020.174/01, 5.9.
412 Nollkaemper, supra note 246, at 1157.
413 See supra Part V.
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ECHR, despite the Dutch Supreme Court in Mothers of Srebrenica
explicitly relying on it for that point.4 14 When the question was
squarely before the Court, in Al-Jedda, the ECtHR skillfully
avoided taking position on this prickly issue.415 However, a plain
language interpretation of Article 103 suggests that the obligation
to grant immunity to the United Nations prevails over any other
international agreement, even human rights treaties.
While the Dutch Court of Appeal in Mothers of Srebrenica
ultimately upheld the immunity of the United Nations, its line of
reasoning is an example of a worrisome trend. The court's finding
that it is legally permissible for a party to the Convention to deny
"absolute" immunity to the United Nations, as provided under that
Convention, has the potential for significant complications. Should
a party to the Convention, whether through legislative, executive,
or judicial action, refuse to accord the U.N. immunity provided
thereunder and allow jurisdiction to be exercised over it, a
potential dispute between the United Nations and that State could
arise. If the Secretary-General simply flouts the plain words of
Section 29, the state of the claimant, or any state party for that
matter, would have a justified cause of complaint to the ICJ under
Section 30, on the basis that the United Nations had breached an
obligation under the Convention. However, being unconvinced
that the procedures at the United Nations level offers the
appropriate guarantees does not justify domestic courts forcing a
State to violate its international responsibilities.
Broader proposals to limit the United Nations' immunity,
based on a lack of functional necessity, are also unjustified. The
Charter and Convention do not resemble the doctrine of absolute
sovereign immunity. Instead, they adhere to the concept of
functional necessity, but give international officials the primary
authority for making immunity decisions. The limited
perspectives of domestic courts are likely to produce rulings that
consistently underestimate the legitimate scope of the U.N.'s
activity and its need for immunity.4 16 Consequently, they are
414 See Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands & United Nations, 200.20.151/01, if
4.3.4-.3.6.
415 See Al-Jedda, App. No. 27021/08 T 102.
416 JENKS,supra note 369, at 41.
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likely to make decisions that impair the capacity of the United
Nations to achieve its objectives,4 17 particularly in controversial
areas such as peace, security, and human rights. Inconsistent
decisions may, in effect, change the actual content of the United
Nations's legitimate function in different countries. When
immunity has been granted to the United Nations and its officials
on the basis of functional necessity, member states should leave
immunity determinations to the international officials and judges
who best understand the needs and functions of the United
Nations.4 18
While legally impermissible, as a practical matter, domestic
courts may well assume jurisdiction if faced with a private law
claim of a prima facie valid nature, if the United Nations does not
provide "appropriate modes of settlement." To head off this
challenge, the United Nations should set up Article 51 standing
claims commissions at the commencement of every mission. Of
course, practical problems are presented by standing claims
commissions in certain cases. As the Secretary-General put it, "in
any event, [such commissions] would be problematic in the
context of Chapter VII operations where no 'host Government'
would be available to participate."" However, in such instances
an independent panel of international jurists would still be far
superior to the current internal and ad hoc procedures. If the
United Nations wishes to avoid unwarranted encroachment by
domestic courts, it needs to ensure that it provides an independent,
efficient, and transparent alternative process to deal with tort
claims.
417 Written Statement Submitted on Behalf of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, supra note 100, T 43-44 (citing several General Assembly Resolutions for the
proposition that "disregard for the privileges and immunities of officials has always
constituted one of the main obstacles to the implementation of the missions and
programmes assigned to the organizations of the United Nations system by Member
States").
418 Brower, supra note 10, at 57.
419 Dispute Settlement Report, supra note 28, 1 17.
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